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Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations: An Analysis
of Judicial Responses
Russell L. Weaver*
Retroactive laws' present special problems for a legal system
because they can upset settled expectations, 2 and can deprive citizens of notice of, and an opportunity to comply with, legal require* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville; B.A., 1974, J.D., 1978, University of Missouri.
1 Laws can be retroactive in several different respects. Munzer, in his article on retroactive legislation, defines retroactivity in the following way:
The phrase "retroactive legislation" as used here covers two groups of stautes
and has an intimate connection with a third group. The main group consists of
laws that alter the legal status, that is, the legal character or consequences, of -)me
pre-enactment action or event. Such laws form the core of what people usually
understand as retroactive legislation and may be called retroactive in the strict
sense. Examples include a statute making criminal an act that was legal when performed, or a curative act making valid a contract or marriage that suffered from
some technical flaw. The second group consists of laws that do not affect the preenactment status of an action but makes a legal judgment regarding that action
easier or harder to obtain. An illustration is a statute, passed after an offense but
before trial, that alters the rules of evidence to make it easier for the state to obtain
a conviction. Courts often view such statutes as involving retroactivity. The final
group consists of laws that do not alter the pre-enactment status of an action but
substantially affect expectations stemming from that action. For instance, a tax
statute might change the method of depreciating rental property. Even if the
change applied only from the date of enactment, it might disrupt the expectations
of someone who purchased a rental building and planned under then-existing laws
to depreciate the building more rapidly.
Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEx. L. REv. 425, 426 (1982). The term "retroactive interpretations," as used in this article, refers to interpretations that fit within Munzer's first category, ones that "alter the legal status... of some [prior] action or event." Id
2 See, e.g., Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1260
(3d Cir. 1978) ("Retroactive laws interfere with the legally-induced settled expectations of
private parties to a greater extent than do prospective enactments."); Adams Nursing
Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1080 (1st Cir. 1977); Leedom v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 108, 278 F.2d 237, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ("The
vice inherent in retroactivity is, of course, that it tends to destroy predictability and to undercut reliance-both important aims of the law."); Local 719, Int'l. Prod., Serv. & Sales
Employees Union v. McLeod, 183 F. Supp. 790, 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). See Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692 (1960)
("Perhaps the most fundamental reason why retroactive legislation is suspect stems from
the principle that a person should be able to plan his conduct with reasonable certainty
....

"); Munzer, supra note 1, at 425; C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 41.05, at 261 (4th ed. 1972):
One of the fundamental considerations of fairness recognized in every legal system is that settled expectations honestly arrived at with respect to substantial interests ought not to be defeated. There is evidence that results achieved through
application ofjudicial instinct, manifested in the pattern of decisions on retroactivity problems, are perhaps best explainable in terms of this fundamental principle
of justice.
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ments.3 Hostility towards retroactive laws is reflected in the ex post
facto clause of the United States Constitution, which prohibits Congress and the states from passing retroactive criminal laws, 4 and in
See also Comment, Prospective Overrulingand Retroactive Application in the FederalCourts, 71 YALE

L.J. 907, 945 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Prospective Overruling].
3 See Munzer, supra note 1, at 426-27. He notes that:
The central purpose of law is to guide behavior. When legislatures create rules, a
person properly forms expectations about how the legal system will respond to his
actions. Retroactive laws frustrate the central purpose of law by disrupting expectations and actions taken in reliance on them. This disruption is always costly and
rarely defensible. Moreover, retroactive lawmaking violates what is often called
the rule of law, namely, an entitlement of persons to guide their behavior by impartial rules that are publicly fixed in advance. This violation undermines human
autonomy by hindering the ability of persons to form plans and carry them out
with due regard for the rights of others.
See also Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 391 (1977) ("[A] person is morally
entitled to know in advance what legal character and consequences his acts have."); C.
SANDS, supra note 2, § 41.02, at 247:
It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that retroactive application of new
laws involves a high risk of being unfair. There is general consensus among all
people that notice or warning of the rules that are to be applied to determine their
affairs should be given in advance of the actions whose effects are to be judged by
them.
4 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law .... "). See, e.g., C. SANDS, supra note 2, § 41.01, at 246 ("Statutes which
retroactively impose or increase the severity of criminal laws as to pre-enactment offenses
are called ex post facto laws and generally are prohibited by specific constitutional provisions."). The clause only prohibits retroactive criminal laws. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386 (1798). See also Slawson, Constitutionaland Legislative Considerations in Retroactive
Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. REV. 216, 222 (1960):

[L]imitation of the criminal sanction seems to rest, ultimately, on a belief in free
will. A man is a criminal only if he chooses to do that which society calls criminal.
Seen from this perspective the absolute ban on ex-post facto criminal laws is explicable as a ban on condemning a man when the element of choice which society has
chosen as its basis of condemnation.., could not have been present.... On this
rationale, the wisdom of Calder v. Bull is evident. Choice is seldom an essential
condition for the civil imposition of duties or deprivations of rights and liberties,
because no one is being morally condemned for having chosen wrongly.
The ex post facto clause generally does not apply to regulatory interpretations. It applies,
by its terms, only to legislative, not judicial, lawmaking. See Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 191 (1977); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352-55 (1964). See also
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981). The due process clause does, however, apply to
judicial actions. See Marks v. United States, supra; Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra.
Regulatory interpretations should, like judicial interpretations, be exempt from the ex
post facto clause. In many instances, an agency's adjudicatory arm will render interpretations, making them judicial in character. Although courts frequently defer to administrative
interpretations, they are not required to do so. Thus, an interpretation does not have the
force and effect of law until a court sustains it. At that point the rule applicable to judicial
interpretations applies-the interpretation is not subject to the ex post facto clause. See
note 16 infra and accompanying text.
Several lower courts have, however, held that the ex post facto clause applies to administrative interpretations. See, e.g., Lerner v. Gill, 580 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (D.R.I. 1984);
Piper v. Perrin, 560 F. Supp. 253, 258 (D.N.H. 1983); Love v. Fitzharris, 311 F. Supp. 702,
703 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See also Holguin v. Raines, 695 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir. 1981). These courts incorrectly assumed that
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at least one of the canons of statutory construction.5 The prohibition against retroactivity is not, however, absolute. Courts frequently sustain retroactive laws. 6 The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that Congress may apply a new statute retroactively, provided its decision to do so is supported by a "legitimate
legislative purpose" which is "furthered by rational means." 7 Additionally, one canon of statutory construction encourages retroactivity by requiring that "an appellate court.., apply the law in effect
at the time it renders its decision." 8 If a new law has taken effect,
the court must apply it retroactively.
the ex post facto clause applies to judicial interpretations. They also assumed that administrative interpretations have the force and effect of law. Based on these misassumptions, the
courts concluded that it was appropriate to apply the clause to administrative interpretations.
Although the ex post facto clause deals with criminal laws, one of its key components,
the requirement of notice, does extend to civil laws and therefore to regulatory interpretations. This notice requirement is reflected in the prohibition against laws that are unduly
vague or ambiguous. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974) (vagueness analysis
incorporates notions of fair notice or warning); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108 (1972) ("[W]e insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning."); Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 162 (1972) ("[All persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids" whch requires "fair notice of the offending conduct.") (quoting
Lonzella v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1979)).
5 See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982) (statutes operate
only prospectively); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199
(1913) ("The first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered as addressed to
the future, not the past."); United States v. American Ref. Sugar Co., 202 U.S. 563, 577
(1906) (quoting United States v. Burr, 159 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1894)):
[W]e are to remember there is a presumption against retrospective operation, and
we have said that words in a statute ought not to have such operation "unless they
are so clear, strong, and imperative, that no other meaning can be annexed to
them, or unless the intention of the legislator cannot be otherwise satisfied."
6 See C. SANDS, supra note 2, § 41.03, at 249.
7 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709, 2718 (1984)
("Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation
remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches."). See also
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) ("[O]ur cases are clear that
legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise
settled expectations.").
8 See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486 n.16 (1981) (quoting
Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969)). See also Bradley v. School
Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974) ("We anchor our holding in this case on the
principle that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless
doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary."); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801):
[I]f, subsequent to the judgment, and before the decision of the appellate court, a
law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be
obeyed, or its obligation denied....

[I]n great national concerns ...

the court

must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law,
the judgment must be set aside.
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Retroactivity problems also arise with interpretations of administrative regulations, 9 especially with initial interpretations. Substantial time can elapse between an agency's issuance of a
regulation and its initial interpretation. If the regulation is vague
or ambiguous, it can be difficult to ascertain what the regulation
requires. A party can seek guidance from the responsible agency,' 0
but that guidance may or may not be forthcoming.'" If the agency
does not provide any guidance, the regulated party is forced to
guess how the agency will interpret the regulation. But guessing
correctly is difficult. The interpretive process is beset by contradictory rules that make accurate prediction difficult.1 2 In addition, the
process can be influenced by extraneous considerations.' 3 NoneSee generally Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C.L. REv.
745, 756-57 (1983).
9 See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 175 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983); Runnells v. Andrus, 484 F. Supp. 1234,
1237-39 (D.Utah 1980); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of Energy, 449 F. Supp.
760, 797 (D. Del.), aff'd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
10 Most agencies issue interpretive rulings on request. The IRS, for example, has special procedures and guidelines. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (1985).
11 See, e.g., Precious Metals Assocs., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 620
F.2d 900, 909 (Ist Cir. 1980).
12 The federal courts have not applied a uniform interpretive theory to regulations. See
Weaver, JudicialInterpretations of Administrative Regulations: An Overview, 53 U. CIN. L. REv.
681, 683-85 (1984) [hereinafter cited as An Overview]. Instead, the courts use a diverse set
of interpretive rules. See Weaver,JudicialInterpretationof Administrative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 587, 599-600 (1984) [hereinafter cited as The Deference Rule].
For example, courts frequently state that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is
entitled to deference. See, e.g., United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977); INS v.
Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72, reh'g denied, 395 U.S. 987 (1969); Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969). However, the courts apply the deference rule inconsistently, and will override it in favor of other seemingly inconsistent rules. See, e.g., M. Kraus
& Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1946) (regulations that carry criminal sanctions should be strictly construed); United States v. Beam, 686 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.
1982). Yet, the courts have no guidelines that indicate when these various rules should be
applied. See The Deference Rule, supra, at 597-600. Thus, courts will occasionally override a
given rule in favor of the deference rule, see Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971)
(deference rule applied to uphold a criminal conviction), or in favor of some other interpretive ru' ., see, e.g.,Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 360 (1956) (regulations should be construed to
give effect to all their provisions); Pennzoil Co.v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 383 (5th Cir. 1981)
(regulations should be construed liberally to effectuate their purpose), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1142 (1982); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128, 134 (8th Cir. 1960) (a
regulation should be interpreted in a manner calculated to avoid constitutional infirmities);
Weissglass Gold Seal Dairy Corp. v. Butz, 369 F. Supp. 632, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (as between two or more possible interpretations of a regulation, the reasonable one should be
chosen).
13 Two major factors often influence the manner in which a regulation is interpreted.
The first is a change in presidential administrations. Frequently, the regulatory philosophy
of a later administration differs from that of a prior administration, see The Deference Rule,
supra note 12, at 612-14, and can influence an agency's interpretation and thereby produce
different results under different administrations. Id. at 613 n. 147. The second factor is that
as an agency gains more expertise with a regulatory scheme, its interpretation of that
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theless, the regulated party must guess
correctly or it may be sub14
jected to an alternate interpretation.
Retroactivity problems can also arise with previously interpreted regulations. Agencies change their initial interpretations, 15
courts sometimes overrule them, 16 and both apply new interpretascheme can change. Id. at 612. The same phenomenon occurs when agencies interpret
statutes. See tenBroek, InterpretiveAdministrativeAction and the Lawmaker's Will, 20 OR. L. REV.
206, 208-09 (1941). See also Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV.
398, 405 (1941).
14 Some courts, however, will overturn alternate interpretations. See Louisiana v. Department of Energy, 507 F. Supp. 1365, 1376 (W.D. La. 1981), aft'd, 690 F.2d 180 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983):
The cases are clear that a post hoc agency interpretation of an ambiguous regulation should not be enforced retroactively against a regulated party who adopted
and applied an alternate reasonable interpretation of the regulation during the
period between the initial promulgation of the ambiguous regulation and the later
agency interpretation ....
See also Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Admin., 453 F. Supp. 203, 238 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd
sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1978) (administrative interpretation of regulation, which was applied retroactively following the first explicit statement of the interpretation, was held invalid). In Saint Francis
Memorial Hosp. v. Weinberger, 413 F. Supp. 323, 332-35 (N.D. Cal. 1976), the meaning of
Medicare reimbursement regulations was unclear. The Medicare Provider Appeals Committee noted that "although it is repugnant to its sense of equity and fairness to apply any
new rule retroactively, Manual Section 206 of HIM-15 is interpretive only for purposes of
clarifying the Regulations and must be applied to all periods under the Medicare Program."
Id- at 334 n.4. The reviewing court disagreed, and noted that "because section 206 conditions the reimbursement of interest expenses during construction on compliance with the
capitalization requirement where no such condition existed before, the court holds that
section 206 may not be applied retroactively." Id at 334. The problem of alternate interpretations also arises when courts interpret statutes. See Moody, Retroactive Application of
Law-ChangingDecisions in Michigan, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 439, 461 (1982):
[M]any first impression cases implicate long standing customs and courses of conduct, and the reliance upon these practices may well be as justified as the reliance
upon an earlier judicial statement.... [A]s with a sudden overruling decision rendered without prior warning, the pure novelty of a first impression ruling may
create a need to cushion its impact upon the parties through the prospectivity
technique.
But see Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law,
79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 60 (1956):

Even when "new law" must be made, it is often in fact a matter of the court articulating particular clear implications of values so generally shared in the society that
the process might well be characterized as declaring a preexisting law. Moreover,
this must inevitably be so. For it is the basic role of courts to decide disputes after
they have arisen. That function requires that judicial decisions operate (at least
ordinarily) with retroactive effect. In turn, unless those decisions (at least ordinarily) reflect preexisting rules or values, such retroactivity would be intolerable.
15 See, e.g., McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1981); Runnells v.
Andrus, 484 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (D. Utah 1980). See also Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v.
Wisconsin Employment Rltns. Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 327 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I
would not make a trap of this settled administrative interpretation by subjecting this employer to penal damages for his good faith reliance on it."); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co.,
355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966).
16 The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
368, 388-89 (1803), established that it is peculiarly the "province and duty of the courts to
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tions retroactively. Nevertheless, the regulated person may be
forced to rely on existing administrative interpretations even
though they might be overruled. Although courts have the authority to independently determine a regulation's meaning,17 they often
defer to administrative interpretations. The Supreme Court has
stated that such interpretations should be accepted provided they
are not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."' 8
Courts frequently reprimand those who fail to comply with administrative interpretations.19 This creates the potential for unfairness:
although courts generally expect compliance with administrative interpretations, they sometimes penalize compliance if the interpreta20
tions are later overruled or revoked.
This article examines how the federal courts respond to the
retroactive effect of interpretations of administrative regulations. It
also suggests a framework for responding to such effect in the
future.
I.

Current Federal Court Approaches to the Retroactivity of
Regulatory Interpretations
A.

The Declaratory Theory

Federal court approaches to retroactive interpretations of regulations vary. One approach, the declaratory theory, 2 ' postulates
say what the law is." See also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 193 (1969); Trust of Bingham v.
Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 671-72 (1945); First Nat'l Bank in Sioux Falls v. National
Bank of S.D., 667 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 1981).
17 The Administrative Procedure Act's judicial review provisions require a reviewing
court to "decide all relevant questions of law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). Despite this provision, the federal courts frequently defer to administrative interpretations. See, e.g., Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Walton
League of Am., Inc., 423 U.S. 12 (1975). The courts do so in an undisciplined manner,
making it difficult to predict when deference will be given, or what the level of deference
will be. See The Deference Rule, supra note 12, at 590-600.
18 United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1972) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole
Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). See also INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969);
Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969).
19 See, e.g., EEOC v. Puget Sound Log Scaling and Grading Bureau, 752 F.2d 1389,
1391 (9th Cir. 1985):
In 1979, the EEOC issued guidelines in question and answer form warning employers that EEOC considered the [Act to apply in the manner in which it was
ultimately applied] .... Puget Sound could predict that those guidelines of the
enforcing agency would be given deference by the courts .... These earlier EEOC
policies should have served as a warning to Puget Sound and other employers ....
20 For a discussion of cases presenting this problem, see United States v. Exxon Corp.,
87 F.R.D. 624, 630-36 (D.D.C. 1980). See also Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965);
Manocchio v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1983); Charbonnet v. United
States, 320 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. La. 1971).
21 Blackstone advocated the declaratory theory in the context ofjudicial interpretation
of precedent rather than interpretation of regulations. In particular, he focused on the
situation in which ajudge overrules prior precedent and then must decide whether to apply
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that regulatory interpretations do not have retroactive effect because interpretations do not create law, but merely declare existing
law. 2 2 Thus, interpretations cannot be retroactive since they do not

23
apply "new law" to prior events.
Even though some courts continue to adhere to it, the declaratory theory has been widely repudiated. 24 Most modem courts and
commentators recognize that interpretations do more than "de-

clare existing law;" they can, in fact, create law. 2 5 Interpretive
the new decision to prior events. Blackstone concluded that the new decision should be
applied because when judges alter legal rules they "do not pretend to make a new law, but
to vindicate an old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision
is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it
was not law." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 70 (T. Cooley 4th
ed. 1884). See also M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 64 (4th ed. 1713); Traynor, Quo

Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question ofJudicialResponsibility, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 533, 534-35
(1977).
22 See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082, 1098
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 576 (1984) ("If Ruling 1974-29 was a
reasonable interpretation .... it had no impact. In that event the impact came from the
statute and valid legislative regulation being interpreted, not from the interpretative ruling."); Gosman v. United States, 573 F.2d 31 (Ct. Cl. 1978) ("All agree that an interpretative rule merely clarifies or explains existing laws or regulations."); Charbonnet v. United
States, 455 F.2d 1195, 1199 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Regulations do not create law; they merely
explain existing legislation. Theoretically, then, we are not called upon to make the law
retroactive, only the administrative agency's interpretation of it.").
23 See, e.g., Petrolite Corp. v. FERC, 667 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1981):
The parties are agreed that if the order exempting hardboard is legislative, then it
is proper for it to be prospective, whereas if the order is interpretative, then it
should be given retroactive effect. The rationale for this distinction is that a commission or agency creates a new law when it issues legislative rules, while it merely
applies existing law when it issues interpretative rules.
See Allen v. Bergland, 661 F.2d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1981) ("An interpretative rule effectuates no change in policy or law and merely explains or clarifies existing law or regulations."). See also Energy Consumers and Prod. Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 632
F.2d 129, 141-42 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832 (1980); Woods v. Benson Hotel Corp., 81 F. Supp. 46, 51-52 (D. Minn. 1948).
24 See Corr, supra note 8, at 746; Moody, supra note 14, at 441; Munzer, supra note 3, at
374-75; Comment, ProspectiveApplication ofJudicialDecisions, 33 ALA. L. REV. 463, 466 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Prospective Application]; Prospective Overruling, supra note 2, at 907-09;
Note, Judicial Review of Reversals of Policy by Administrative Agencies, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1251,
1255-56 (1955). But there were historical reasons for its development. See Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REv. 121 (1940).
25 See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("Construction, no doubt, is not a mechanical process and even when most scrupulously
pursued by judges may not wholly escape some retrospective infusion so that the line between interpretation and substitution is sometimes thin."); 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 7.23, at 112 (2d ed. 1979):
If interpretative rules were always merely interpretations of law that already exists,
they could never be retroactive, for if they fail to reflect the true meaning of the
law they interpret, they would be invalid for that reason, and if they reflect that
meaning they do not make law retroactively. The obvious reality is, of course, that
what is done in the name of interpretation often adds to the meaning that is already in what is interpreted ....

See also R.

DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES

27 (1975);

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:167

problems can arise that the promulgating agency did not anticipate. 26 Thus, a court has no law to find and declare, at least in the
sense that the promulgating agency considered the interpretive
problem and prescribed a solution. 27 Moreover, since the problem
was unanticipated, a reviewing court that carefully examines a regulation's history may find only the most general guidance, or none at
all.

28

If available interpretive materials do not provide an answer to
an interpretive problem, the reviewing court must provide the answer itself.2 9 In doing so, the court creates law30 by qualifying, re-

3
stricting, or adding to vague or ambiguous regulatory language. '
The degree to which the court may be creative depends on the interpretive problem. The regulation's language and available interpretive materials may severely restrict the range of interpretive
options. If these do not, the interpreting court may be free to
choose from several different interpretations which produce very

different results.32
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1898-99); Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretationof Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470, 491-92 (1950); Slawson, supra note 4, at 245. But see Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legislation is Viewed as a
Legal Institution, 3 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 191, 191-95 (1966).
26 See An Overview, supra note 12, at 692-94.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 694-99.
29 Id. at 689-90, 699-701.
30 See Corr, Administrative Law and the Interpretationof Statutes, 1 U. TORONTO LJ.286, 291
(1935) ("In many cases, there is no logical compulsion on the judge to accept a single
meaning; two or more possible meanings are open to him. In making his choice he makes
law in spite of his protestations to the contrary.").
31 See Morgenthau, Implied Regulatory Powers in Administrative Law, 28 IowA L. REV. 575,
585 (1943):
What administrative agencies and courts do when they interpret a statutory provision ...is, therefore, not in essence, but only in the degree of discretion which the
interpreting officer may exercise, different from what Congress is doing when it
legislates under the Constitution.... They all legislate by substituting specific,
individualized rules for general and abstract rules and by thus creating rules of law
which would not exist had they not been created by them; they all interpret by
remaining, while legislating, within the limits of abstract, general rules of law. He
who interprets of necessity legislates, and he who legislates of necessity interprets.
See also M. COHEN & F. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 450-54
(1951).
32 Professor Dickerson provides a sound discussion of the subject in his analysis of
statutory construction:
[W]e may conclude that whenever a court can say with reasonable confidence,
"This reading of the statute is one that the typical reader views as most probably
intended by the legislature," it has ascertained the meaning of the statute in the
general sense. Such a conclusion, being one of fact, is reached for the most part
according to the cognitive aspects of communication principles not peculiar to the
law. We may conclude also that, whenever a court can say only "We cannot be
reasonably sure which, if any, of a wide range of compatible readings was probably
the intended one," or "What we perceive to be the meaning of the statute does not
adequately resolve the current controversy," the meaning that it thereupon as-
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B.

Retroactivity

Those courts which recognize that regulatory interpretations
can have retroactive effect are forced to determine whether that effect is desirable or permissible. 33 They do so under a model formulated by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,34 which requires
a reviewing court to balance:
[s]uch retroactivity ... against the mischief of producing a result
which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable
principles. If that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the
retroactive application of a new standard,
it is not the type of
35
retroactivity which is condemned by law.
Chenery itself did not involve an interpretation of a regulation.
Rather, it involved the question of whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could create legislative rules by adjudication, without using notice and comment procedures, and whether
it could then apply those new rules retroactively. 36 The Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 mandated that utility
reorganizations must be "fair and equitable to the persons affected
thereby," 37 that securities could not be issued on terms "detrimental to the public interest or the interests of investors," 3 8 and that
the reorganization may not result in the "unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power." 39 In Chenety, the SEC was forced to apply these general provisions to a previously unaddressed situation:
a reorganization plan which distributed preferred stock to a comsigns to the statute involves the kind of disciplined creativity that is more appropriately classed as 'judicial lawmaking." The problem of choosing among a number
of plausible alternatives, not calling for an act of discovery, is not one of fact, but
ofjudicial responsibility discharged according to principles peculiar to the law.
R. DICKERSON, supra note 25, at 27.
33 See, e.g., Stewart Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846, 848-49 (10th Cir. 1983);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1982); McDonald v. Watt,
653 F.2d 1035, 1042-46 (5th Cir. 1981).
34 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
35 Id. at 203.
36 The Court confronted the same problem again in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267 (1974). Like Chenery, Bell involved the question of whether precedent and interpretation of a statute could be applied retroactively. Unlike Chenery, Bell involved a case of
second impression. Prior administrative decisions suggested that Bell's interpretation was
correct. But the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) reversed its prior decisions, and
sought to apply its new decision to Bell. The Supreme Court affirmed the NLRB's right to
alter its prior precedent, as well as its right to apply the new precedent retroactively. The
Court emphasized that the NLRB was not seeking to impose either a fine or damages on
Bell. Moreover, the Court noted that the matter was not final because the case had to be
remanded for a final determination about whether Bell had violated the new interpretation.
Id. at 294-95. At the same time, the Court held that, under the facts, "the Board 'is not now
free' to read a new and more restrictive meaning into the Act." Id. at 289.
37 Chenery, 332 U.S. at 204.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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pany's officers and directors. The SEC invalidated the provision
and in the process formulated a general prohibition against such
40
distributions.
The Supreme Court upheld the SEC's decision to create the
rule adjudicatively and to apply the new rule retroactively. The
Court suggested that although it is generally preferable for an
agency to create rules in advance using its notice and comment procedures, an agency could create adjudicative rules. 4 l To the extent
that the latter rules had retroactive effect, they had to be subjected
to the balancing test. Applying the test, the Court held that the
regulatory interest in applying the interpretation retroactively outweighed the ill effect. 4 2 Lower federal courts have extended Chenery
to interpretations of regulations. 43 This extension was appropriate
because many interpretations are initially announced in the form of
44
precedent.
C.

Estoppel

Some courts consider retroactivity issues under an estoppel
analysis, determining whether an agency should be estopped from
retroactively imposing a regulatory interpretation. This argument
often surfaces when agencies revoke prior interpretations which
parties have relied on and then substitute inconsistent ones. 45
Courts usually reject estoppel claims. The general rule is that the
government cannot be estopped, 46 a rule that courts apply to inter40 Id.
41 Id. at 201-05.
42 Id. at 203.
43 See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 175 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983); Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39 (9th Cir.
1978); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of Energy, 449 F. Supp. 760, 797 (D. Del.),
aff'd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1978).
44 See, e.g., McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1981); Runnells v.
Andrus, 484 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (D. Utah. 1980).
45 See, e.g., Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 726 F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 99 (1984) (plaintiff argued that the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service should be estopped from applying a regulation literally because he published, during
the relevant time period, a different interpretation; the court rejected the estoppel claim);
United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816, 845-48 (D.D.C. 1983) (estoppel claim
rejected because defendant's reliance was not reasonable, and because of judicial reluctance to estop the government); Tenneco Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 475 F. Supp.
299, 312 (D. Del. 1979) (court declined to consider an argument that the Department of
Energy should be precluded from applying an interpretation retroactively because the
plaintiff failed to raise it in prior administrative proceedings). See also Manocchio v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1400, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1983) (court rejected an allegation that the IRS
should be estopped from denying a deduction when the taxpayer relied on a misleading
revenue ruling and IRS publication construing the Internal Revenue Code).
46 See Heckler v. Community Health Serv. of Crawford County, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2218,
2224 (1984); INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v.
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pretations. 47 Only the lower courts have imposed an estoppel, and
48
then only in unusual circumstances.
D.

Vagueness

Courts also decide retroactivity issues under a vagueness analysis. Instead of focusing on an interpretation's retroactive effect,
courts focus on whether the underlying regulation is unduly vague
or ambiguous. 49 Vagueness challenges allege that a regulation is
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 (1947); Woodstock/Kenosha Health Center v. Schweiker, 713
F.2d 285, 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981)
("This Court has never decided what type of conduct by a Government employee will estop
the Government from insisting upon compliance with valid regulations .... "); Montana v.
Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 315 (1961) ("[W]e need not stop to inquire whether, as some lower
courts have held, there may be circumstances in which the United States is estopped to
deny citizenship because of conduct of its officials."). Some lower courts do, however,
allow the government to be estopped. See Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 116162 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988-90 (9th Cir. 1973).
47 See Heckler v. Community Health Serv. of Crawford County, Inc. 104 S. Ct. 2218,
2227 (1984) (agency's fiscal intermediary gave erroneous advice about the proper meaning
and application of regulatory provisions; the Supreme Court held that the agency was not
estopped); Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 744 F.2d 1411, 1416 (10th Cir.
1984) ("Emery's estoppel argument also must fail.... To the extent Emery relied on an
interpretation by MSHA officials of the Act's implementing regulations, Emery assumed the
risk that interpretation was in error."); Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d
156, 176 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982) ("There is simply no basis in the circumstances of
the present case to find unreasonableness, unfairness, or any element of estoppel in applying the agency interpretation to the relevant period in question here .... "), cert. dismissed,
459 U.S. 1190 (1983); United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816, 845-48 (D.D.C.
1983).
Most cases,.however, involve interpretations of statutes rather than regulations. See
Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957) (court notes that
the Commissioner cannot be estopped from revoking an interpretation retroactively); Manocchio v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1400, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1983) (estoppel claim rejected
on several grounds: IRS presumes that revenue rulings will be retroactive; estoppel should
be applied against the government only with the utmost caution and restraint; Congress,
not the Commissioner, makes the tax laws, and any mistakes made by the Commissioner
must therefore be corrected; and injury to this taxpayer was not so severe as to be
"profound and unconscionable"); Pollack v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir.
1968) ("The Commissioner may indeed retroactively correct any prior erroneous interpretation of the law, even though a taxpayer may have relied to his detriment on the Commissioner's mistake .... ").
48 See Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 318 (9th Cir. 1962) ("It is our conclusion that the Bank's equitable interest is so compelling, and the loss which it would sustain
so unwarrantable, as to justify the application of the estoppel doctrine against the Commissioner."); Elkins v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 669, 679-81 (1983) (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue cannot apply an interpretation retroactively when "there is evidence of unconscionable injury or undue hardship suffered by the taxpayer through reliance on the erroneous position") (quoting with approval from Manocchio v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 989, 1001
(1982), aff'd, 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1983)). See generally Note, The Due ProcessImplications of
Estoppel Claims in Deportation Proceedings, 60 Tzx. L. REv. 61 (1981).
49 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 49798 (1982); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1335-36 (6th Cir. 1978). See generally Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Means To An End, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960); Collings,
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inadequate in one of two ways: that it fails to give those subject to
it fair notice of what is required, and therefore deprives them of an
opportunity to comply with those requirements; 50 or that it fails to
give meaningful standards to those who enforce the regulation,
leaving them to enforce it in an arbitrary or discriminatory
5
manner. 1
Under the vagueness approach, judicial review has generally
been limited. 52 Most regulations implicate only economic activity,
and courts will tolerate more indefiniteness in economic regulations than in regulations affecting fundamental rights. 53 There are
UnconstitutionalUncertainty-AnAppraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q 195 (1955). When economic regulations are involved, courts apply a somewhat lower standard. See text accompanying
notes 53-60 infra.
50 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 49798 (1982); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("Vague laws may trap
the innocent by not providing fair warning."). See also Force, Decriminalizationof Breach of the
Peace Statutes: A Nonpenal Approach to Order Maintenance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 367, 431 (1972);
Kuhn,Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 276 (1968); Ratner, The
Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048, 1085 (1968); Robinson, The FCC
and the FirstAmendment. Observationson 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L.
REV. 67, 146-47 (1967).

51 See Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) ("A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."); Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (Vagueness requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials to prevent them from pursuing their personal predilections. "Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of
the criminal law."). See also Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 671, 674 (1976); Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Principlesto Selective Enforcement of the CriminalLaw, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 88, 98 (1973); Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and
the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 197, 201 (1985); Klein, Film Censorship:
The American and British Experience, 12 VILL. L. REv. 419, 428 (1967).
52 Initially, there was some doubt about whether the vagueness doctrine applied to enactments with only economic implications. See Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258
U.S. 242 (1922). Subsequent decisions suggest that the doctrine does apply to such enactments. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967); A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar
Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925). The Court rejected the suggestion in Levy Leasing that
the void for vagueness doctrine is inapplicable in civil cases:
The ground or principle of the decisions was not such as to be applicable only to
criminal prosecutions. It was not the criminal penalty that was held invalid, but
the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard which was so vague and indefinite
as really to be no rule or standard at all.
267 U.S. at 239. See also Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 69-70 n. 16; Collings, supra note 49, at
208.
53 See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 n.10 (1974) (in dicta the court referred to
"the less stringent requirements of the modem vagueness cases dealing with purely economic regulation"); United States v. Batson, 706 F.2d 657, 679 (5th Cir. 1983); Exxon
Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir.) (In dealing with a problem of statutory
interpretation the court stated that: "[b]ecause the statute is not concerned with either the
first amendment or the definition of criminal conduct, however, we must be lenient in evaluating its constitutionality."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932 (1981); Brennan v. OSHRC, 505
F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1974); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 553 F. Supp. 1220, 1233
(D.R.I. 1982).
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several justifications for this decreased level of scrutiny: many regulatory schemes implicate limited subject areas, and those subject
to regulation can be expected to take affirmative steps to resolve
ambiguity or uncertainty;5 4 those subject to a regulation can resolve
uncertainty by seeking interpretive guidance from the responsible
agency; 55 economic interests are generally entitled to less protection than more fundamental rights; 56 and the penalties attached to
violations of economic regulations are deemed to be qualitatively
less severe.5 7 Moreover, courts tend to evaluate economic regulations under an "as applied" standard. 58 Even though a regulation
may be vague on its face, it can withstand a vagueness challenge if it
is not vague as applied to the defendant. 59 Thus, retroactive inter60
pretations are routinely upheld.
Under vagueness doctrine, courts are more willing to invali54 See Heckler v. Community Health Serv. of Crawford County, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2218,
2222 (1984).
55 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498
(1982); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 553 F. Supp. 1220, 1235 (D.R.I. 1982).
56 See text accompanying notes 61-64 infra.
57 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498
(1982). The review standard for economic interests is somewhat vague. The Supreme
Court has stated that economic provisions must be set out in terms ordinary people exercising common sense can understand. See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S.
337, 340 (1952); Ricci v. United States, 507 F.2d 1390, 1398 (Ct. Cl. 1974). See also Brennan v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1974). Somewhat less scrutiny may, in fact, be
applied. See text accompanying notes 119-125 infra. Moreover, when the regulation is directed at a limited audience possessing specialized knowledge or understanding, a court
will evaluate the regulation in light of that specialized knowledge or understanding. See
Fleming v. Department of Agriculture, 713 F.2d 179, 184 (6th Cir. 1983); Precious Metals
Assocs., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 620 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir. 1980).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Batson, 706 F.2d 657, 678-80 (5th Cir. 1983); Magic Valley
Potato Shippers, Inc. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 702 F.2d 840, 841 (9th Cir. 1983); Ray
Evers Welding Co. v. OSHRC, 625 F.2d 726, 732 (6th Cir. 1980). See also United States v.
National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963).
59 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir.) ("Section 1104.1 is,
while most assuredly not a 'model of clarity,'
at least amenable to some sensible construction. Thus, it does alert the parties to the character of the proscribed conduct, .. . and
does amount to something more than 'no rule ... at all.' "), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932 (1981).
60 See, e.g., Precious Metals Assocs., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 620
F.2d 900, 906-08 (Ist Cir. 1980) (upholding provision against allegations of vagueness);
National Indus. Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding OSHA regulation against vagueness challenge).
The one major exception has involved challenges against OSHA's personal protective
regulation. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a) (1982). Although most courts reject vagueness challenges levied against this regulation, see Voegele Co. v. OSHRC, 625 F.2d 1075, 1076 (3d
Cir. 1980); General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 464 (1st Cir. 1979);Jensen
Constr. Co. of Okla., Inc. v. OSHRC, 597 F.2d 246, 248 (10th Cir. 1979), at least two cases
have invalidated OSHA's attempt to apply the regulation: Cape and Vineyard Div. of New
Bedford Gas v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir. 1975) (regulation did not give fair warning
of what was required); B & B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1978)
(invalidated agency's interpretation because it did not conform to industry practice). The
latter decision was probably incorrect. See text accompanying notes 165-69 infra.
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date regulations which affect fundamental constitutional rights-in61
terests that have traditionally been accorded greater protection.
62
Included are regulations which implicate the freedom of speech,
and regulations that are applied in a criminal 63 or quasi-criminal
61 Any enactment that impinges on a fundamental constitutional right, especially one
affecting first amendment rights, will receive an increased level of scrutiny under the vagueness doctrine. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498 (1982); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959). See also Rogge, State
Power Over Sedition, Obscenity and Picketing, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 817, 846 (1959); Amsterdam,
supra note 49, at 75; Collings, supra note 49, at 214:
There remain to be considered... cases ... where the statute was so broad and
sweeping as to prohibit conduct protected by the Constitution. This is an area
where the Supreme Court, at least in the twenty years since the mid-thirties, has
seemingly recognized its special competence. As might be expected it is an area
where the uncertainty doctrine has considerable viability ....
62 Regulations impinging on first amendment rights are scrutinized more closely because they can have a "chilling" effect on those rights. See Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). See also Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959); Walters v. Peterson, 495 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Force, supra
note 50, at 431; Ratner, supra note 50, at 1085.
Moreover, such regulations are generally examined for facial invalidity, rather than
vagueness as applied. See United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36
(1963). A court may use an "as applied" standard, however, if the regulation has only a
peripheral effect on first amendment rights. In Walters, supra, the court refused to apply a
regulation prohibiting "misconduct which violates common decency in employee relations"
to sustain an employee dismissal. The employees had picketed an agency cafeteria to protest alleged racism by supervisors. As part of their demonstration, they carried signs which
read "Pigs Off Census" near two supervisors who were eating lunch. In refusing to uphold
the dismissal, the court noted that the regulation was vague. It then emphasized that the
agency had tolerated similar conduct on prior occasions. The court held that this prior
tolerance, coupled with the regulation's vagueness, rendered the agency's application in
this instance unacceptable. 495 F.2d at 100-01.
Vagueness challenges arose frequently during the 1960s and 1970s with regard to student conduct regulations. See Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 MIcH. L. REV.
393, 400-01 (1971); Marinelli, Student Conduct Regulations, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 125 (1973);
Van Alstyne, ProceduralDue Process and State University Students, 10 UCLA L. REv. 368, 389
(1963).
63 A heightened standard of review is applied in the criminal context because the potential penalties are qualitatively more severe. See Flemming v. Department of Agriculture,
713 F.2d 179, 184 (6th Cir. 1983) ("This standard for definiteness is less stringently measured in the absence of either criminal penalties or potential interference with constitutionally protected rights."); United States v. Batson, 706 F.2d 657, 679 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The
Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal
penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.") (quoting
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 445 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)).
See also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
515 (1948) (in dealing with a vague statute the Court noted that more certainty is required
of criminal statutes).
No court has clearly articulated the precise standard of review. Some courts state that
a regulation must contain "ascertainable standards of guilt," or standards "sufficiently definite to give notice of required or prohibited conduct." See W1inters, 333 U.S. at 515. Other
courts state that no more than a reasonable degree of certainty is required. See Ricci v.
United States, 507 F.2d 1390, 1398 (Ct. CL. 1974).
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context. 64 In these contexts, courts are more sensitive to the fact
that regulatory interpretations can be "law creating," and examine
65
more carefully whether retroactive effect is permissible.
E.

Indirect Challenges

Retroactivity issues can also surface indirectly. Regulations are
usually interpreted, at least initially, by agencies rather than courts.
In indirect challenges, litigants seek to invalidate these administrative interpretations. If they succeed, the court will not apply the
interpretation at all, much less retroactively.
Litigants have persuaded courts to invalidate administrative interpretations on several grounds. One ground is that the interpretation is incorrect because it conflicts with the language or intent of
a regulation. 66 Although the courts have not developed a uniform
approach to interpreting regulations, many courts apply the intent
theory whereby regulations are construed to effectuate the intent of
the promulgating agency as of the date of promulgation.6 7 These
64 See generally Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489 (1982); Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1335-36 (6th Cir. 1978).
65 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 116-17 (1974); Bouje v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1964):
When a similarly unforeseeable state-court construction of a criminal statute is
applied retroactively to subject a person to criminal liability for past conduct, the
effect is to deprive him of due process of law in the sense of fair warning that his
contemplated conduct constitutes a crime ....
[I]f the result above stated were
attained by an exercise of the State's legislative power, the transgression of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would be obvious," and "[t]he
violation is none the less clear when that result is accomplished by the state judiciary in the course of construing an otherwise valid... state statute."
(quoting from Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 679-80 (1930));
Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941) ("[A] judicial enlargement of a criminal
act by interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes
must be defined with appropriate definiteness.").
66 Agencies and courts can use a number of different theories in interpreting regulations. The "intent" theory provides that a regulation should be construed in accordance
with the intent of the enacting body. The "meaning" theory states that the interpretive
goal is to uncover the meaning of the regulation. The "purpose" theory holds that a regulation should be construed to effectuate its purpose or objective. In addition, there are two
other interpretive theories. One states that a judge should interpret a regulation in a manner designed to effectuate his own "social emotions" and "ideal scheme of society." The
other provides that a judge should interpret a regulation in a manner designed to avoid
unjust results. For a discussion of these theories, seeAn Overview, supra note 12, at 684-708.
There are a number of useful, high quality articles on the subject of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, supra note 25; FIAnkfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947).

67 See, e.g., Rucker v. Wabash R.R. Co., 418 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1969); Harnischfeger Corp. v. EPA, 515 F. Supp. 1310, 1314 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Honeywell, Inc. v. United
States, 661 F.2d 182, 186 (Ct. Cl. 1981). Some courts use the terms "intent" and "purpose" interchangeably. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15, 18 (10th Cir. 1973);
Rucker, 418 F.2d at 150. Max Radin has written a stinging criticism of the intent and purpose theories. Radin, Statutory Interpretations,43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930). Although that
article contains many sound criticisms, it goes too far. Indeed, Radin retreated from his
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courts evaluate a regulation's language to see whether it is susceptible to the interpretation given. If not, the court will invalidate the
interpretation. 6 8 Even if the regulation is susceptible to the
agency's interpretation, these courts will evaluate the interpretation
to make certain that it conforms to the regulation's intent. In some
cases, litigants have demonstrated that an agency intended a regulation to mean one thing at the date of promulgation, but then subsequently interpreted the regulation in an inconsistent manner. In
69
these cases courts have invalidated the interpretation.
A second ground on which litigants have overturned administrative interpretations is by convincing a reviewing court to disre70
gard the agency's interpretation and render its own instead.
7
Courts have the right to independently interpret regulations. '
When agencies seek to retroactively apply interpretations of ambigposition in later years. See Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388 (1942)
(arguing that courts construe statutes according to their purpose). Moreover, his theories
received substantial criticism. A contemporaneous response was prepared by James Landis. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930). Radin was
partially persuaded by Landis, and his 1942 article contains an admission to that effect.
There are other criticisms of Radin's theories as well. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 25, at
78; An Overview, supra note 12, at 684-708.
68 See, e.g., Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 577 F.2d 1113, 1119 (10th Cir. 1977). In
the Usery case, an OSHA Regulation required that employers "provide" ladders to employees working on scaffolds. The Secretary of Labor interpreted the regulation as requiring
employers to provide employees with ladders, and to force employees to use them. The
court rejected the interpretation, noting that a "regulation cannot be construed to mean
what an agency intended but did not adequately express."
69 See Sauder v. Department of Energy, 648 F.2d 1341, 1346 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1981). In Sauder, the court characterized its holding in Tenneco Oil Co. v. FEA, 613 F.2d
298 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979), in the following manner: "We refuse (sic) to defer to
the agency's interpretation of its regulations, not because the agency's interpretation was
merely 'reasonable' and 'not compelled,' but because the agency sought to impose an interpretation 'plainly inconsistent with the language of the regulation."' See also Fairfax Nursing Center, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1297, 1301 (4th Cir. 1979) ("The Secretary is not free
to promulgate regulations and then change their meaning by 'clarifications' or 'interpretations' issued without formal notice and comment. To do so would frustrate the policies of
fair notice and comment in the Administrative Procedure Act.") (These statements are dicta
because the court concluded that the problem was not presented.).
70 Courts frequently defer to agency interpretations. See text accompanying notes 1720 supra. Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas has stated that "the judicially created doctrine
of deference to agency interpretations of law, which some courts have elevated to a virtual
presumption of correctness, places the bureaucratic thumb on the scales ofjustice, weighting them against the citizen." S. REP. No. 24, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1981).
A strong argument can be made, however, that courts apply the deference rule in a
result-oriented manner, giving deference only when it suits them. See The Deference Rule,
supra note 12, at 590-91. See also K. DAVIS, supra note 25, at § 7.13; Gellhorn & Robinson,
Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780-81 (1975); Landis, supra note
67, at 890; Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 n.18
(1983); Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agenty Action, 31 AD. L.
REV. 329, 335 (1979); Note,JudicialReview of Regulations and Rulings Under the Revenue Acts, 52
HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (1939).
71 See notes 16-17 supra.
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uous regulations, courts will sometimes exercise that right. 72
Courts will also reject the agency's interpretation if the agency has
taken inconsistent positions regarding the meaning of its
73
regulations.
Many litigants strengthen their indirect challenges through the
discovery process. 74 They may seek to reveal the agency's original
intent regarding the meaning of a regulation, or they may seek to
demonstrate that the agency's current interpretation is inconsistent
with a prior one 75 or has been inconsistently applied. 76 Of course,
72 See Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 173 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983):
StandardOil is a frequently cited and highly significant decision in the context of its
particular circumstances. Where, as on points at issue there, an agency by legislative rulemaking has established no regulatory lodestar and its institutional compass has pointed in opposite or shifting directions, the rule of deference will not
sustain the retroactive application of an interpretation of which an affected interest
had no fair notice.
This statement is dicta. The court concluded that the agency's "regulatory lodestar" did
not point in differing directions in the case. See also Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Department of Energy, 656 F.2d 690, 695 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981).
73 Pennzoil, 680 F.2d at 173.
74 The impetus for this discovery was the holding in Standard Oil Co. v. Department of
Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). Litigants there obtained comparable
discovery in the lower court and used it to overturn the agency's interpretation. For a
discussion of the Standard Oil case and its impact, see Weaver, Contemporaneous Construction
Discovery: Its Use andAbuse, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 367, 375-80 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Contemporaneous ConstructionDiscovery].
This discovery has been called "contemporaneous construction discovery," a label
which is misleading. The label implies that discovery is sought solely for the purpose of
determining whether an interpretation was contemporaneously issued and therefore is entitled to heightened deference under the contemporaneous construction principle. For a
discussion of that principle, see Great N. Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 275 (1942);
Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (contemporaneous construction of a statute by men charged with setting its machinery into motion is entitled to deference). Discovery is sought for that purpose. But the label also includes
discovery sought for the purpose of determining whether an interpretation has been consistently applied. See cases cited at note 77 infra. It also includes discovery sought for the
purpose of determining whether an interpretation conforms to the "intent" of the regulation. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (discovery
requested of "agency officials responsible for formulating and interpreting regulations").
See also McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Energy, 650 F.2d 1216, 1229
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (discovery of rulemaking officials allowed); Amoco Prod. Co.
v. Department of Energy, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 402, 404-05 (D. Del. 1979) (the
court extended discovery to pre-promulgation documents in an attempt to find out what
"the law was").
75 See Hydrocarbon Trading & Transp. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 89 F.R.D. 650, 655
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Exxon contends that DOE's recent, nonfinal pronouncements interpreting § 211.9(a)(1) to encompass unlike product exchanges are inconsistent with the alleged
contemporaneous construction accorded § 211.9(a)(1) ....
According to Exxon, it is entitled to conduct discovery to establish that DOE's recent, post hoc interpretation of the regulation is not entitled to deference .......
Discovery was denied.); Tenneco Oil Co. v.
Department of Energy, 475 F. Supp. 299, 318 (D. Del. 1979) (Tenneco allowed to discover
contemporaneous construction as well as subsequent application by agency).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Exxon Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624, 630-33 (D.D.C. 1980) (Exxon
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discovery is sometimes unnecessary. For example, it is often easy
for a litigant to demonstrate that some interpretations have not
been consistently applied and therefore are not entitled to deference. By definition, this is true when an agency changes its interpretation; the latter interpretation is necessarily inconsistent with
the former. 7 7 But discovery may reveal that what appears to be a
first impression interpretation is, in fact, a second impression interpretation. Although an agency has not formally interpreted a regulation, its personnel may have applied the regulation internally. If
these internal interpretations are inconsistent with the agency's
current interpretation, some courts refuse to defer to the current
interpretation. 78 Additionally, administrative personnel may have
informally advised those subject to the regulations to apply them in
a particular manner. In a few instances, courts have accepted this
79
advice as evidence of inconsistency.
Recent judicial decisions have curtailed the use of indirect challenges by restricting the availability of discovery.8 0 Previously, only
the Department of Energy was subject to such discovery, 8 1 and that
discovery presented substantial problems for the judiciary. Attempts to obtain discovery led to disputes about the necessity of the
discovery82 and whether the responsive documents were privileged. 8 3 Because many litigants sought large numbers of docuallowed to discover low level, unofficial agency statements that applied relevant provisions

to determine if the regulations the agency sought to enforce retroactively were consistent
with agency statements at the time in question). See also Quincy Oil, Inc. v. Federal Energy
Admin., 468 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D. Mass. 1979).
77 See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 175 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983). See note 72 supra; Sauder v. Department of
Energy, 648 F.2d 1341, 1346 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (Referring to its decision in
StandardOil, the court noted that "in refusing to defer to the agency's last interpretation of
its regulations, we emphasized ... the extraordinarily confused and contradictory agency
interpretations which had preceded it."); Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955)
(The agency's initial interpretation was rendered in 1940, but was later revoked and replaced by an inconsistent interpretation. The court refused to accept the later interpretation, noting that the prior interpretation was of long standing and had not previously been
altered.).
78 See Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029, 1056 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1978). See also Contemporaneous Construction Discovery, supra note 74.
79 Standard Oil, 596 F.2d at 1056.
80 See Contemporaneous Construction Discovery, supra note 74.

81 This type of discovery developed as a result of the holding in StandardOil, 596 F.2d
at 1056, and continued to afflict that Department for many years. See, e.g., United States v.
Exxon Corp., 87 F.R.D. at 630-33; Tenneco Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 475 F. Supp.
299, 318 (D. Del. 1979); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913, 916-17 (E.D. Pa.
1979). Despite the success achieved by litigants against the DOE, discovery was not extended to other agencies.
82 See, e.g., Hydrocarbon Trading & Transp. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 89 F.R.D. 650, 655-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Tenneco Oil Co., 475 F. Supp. at 317-18; Quincy Oil, Inc., 468 F. Supp. at
387-88; Petrolane, Inc. v. United States, 79 F.R.D. 115, 119 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
83 See, e.g., Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514, 520-22 (D. Del. 1980) (claim of

1986]

RETROACTIVE REGULATORY INTERPRETATIONS

ments in their discovery requests, and privilege disputes frequently
extended to a percentage of the documents sought, a large number
of documents were involved. 84 Courts were thus forced to resolve
these disputes, sometimes on a document-by-document basis, requiring substantial expenditure of limited judicial resources. This
situation prompted the courts to impose limitations on the scope of
discovery. 85
Nevertheless, indirect challenges remain a viable option. Because an agency's announced interpretations may sometimes conflict, litigants can demonstrate, even without discovery, that an
agency has taken inconsistent positions regarding the meaning of
its regulations. Moreover, discovery, although restricted, is still
available and can be used to garner additional support for overcoming an interpretation.
A final way to overturn regulatory interpretations is by manipulating the canons of construction. As noted above, the courts have
not developed a uniform theory for interpreting regulations,8 6 and
attorney-client and work product privileges rejected); United States v. Exxon Corp., 87
F.R.D. at 636-39 (no privilege asserted but court raised matter on its own motion to provide guidelines for the parties); Tenneco Oil Co., 475 F. Supp. at 318-19; Gulf Oil Corp., 465 F.
Supp. at 916-17.
84 Twenty five hundred documents were involved in Exxon Corp. v. United States, No.
75-0836 W (N.D. Tex.June 9, 1980), discussedin Department of Energy v. Crocker, 629 F.2d
1341, 1345 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1980). These cases produced cries of exasperation
from thejudiciary. During oral argument in one case, thejudge remarked that "this type of
litigation just cannot be controlled under present circumstances." Crocker, 629 F.2d at 1345
(quoting Petitioners' Response to Supplemental Brief at Appendix A, Tr. of Argument at
44, Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514 (D. Del. 1980)). The Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals remarked that it was "aware of the burden imposed upon the district
judges by the broad discovery, covering hundreds or even thousands of documents, undertaken by parties in litigation with [the] DOE, given the assertion of privileges, as here, with
respect to such a relatively large proportion of the documents sought." Crocker, 629 F.2d at
1345.
85 Early cases extended discovery to the lowest levels of the DOE, thereby geometrically expanding the number of responsive documents since that agency, like others, is
pyramidal in structure. See, e.g., United States v. Exxon Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624, 634 (D.D.C.
1980) (DOE ordered to search files at the national and regional level and to search "case
specific law enforcement files" at the branch level); Tenneco Oil Co., 475 F. Supp. at 318
(concluding that "internal memoranda, directives and guidelines generated and disseminated at a variety of levels are proper items of discovery"). The scope of this discovery was
heavily influenced by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals' (TECA) statement in an
earlier case that lower-level files might be relevant on the question of deference. Standard
Oil, 596 F.2d at 1056 (Federal Energy Administration contended that "only the... General
Counsel, his staff, and other 'high level policy makers' had the authority to issue official
interpretations of its regulations." The court noted that it was entitled to consider how the
regulation had been applied in fact by those officials, as well as by lower-level officials.). In
Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 171 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982),
after a spate of requests for contemporaneous construction discovery, the TECA retreated.
It held that "opinions are to be given little weight, as such, unless they are institutional in
character."
86 See text accompanying notes 21-32 supra.
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instead have applied a variety of rules.8 7 In some cases courts reject
administrative interpretations by ignoring the presumption of deference in favor of other interpretive principles. 8 Litigants can,
therefore, increase their chances of having a reviewing court overturn a regulatory interpretation by carefully choosing the interpretive principles they argue to the court.
II.

Problems With Current Approaches
A.

Inconsistencies

Current judicial approaches to retroactivity leave much to be
desired. As in other interpretive areas, the courts use diverse approaches which give them broad discretion.8 9 If a court chooses to
reject a retroactivity claim, it can find that interpretations do not
create law, but merely declare existing law. It can then hold that
the regulation has no retroactive effect. 90 If a court chooses to accept a retroactivity claim, it can do so under many different theories: vagueness, retroactivity, and perhaps estoppel. It can also
reject the agency's interpretation and render its own. 9 1
It is difficult to reconcile these various approaches because
they start from disparate premises. For example, the declaratory
theory seems to conflict with the retroactivity and vagueness theories on whether regulatory interpretations create law and whether
they can have retroactive effect. 92 Estoppel and retroactivity theories also conflict. Estoppel theory starts with the premise that the
government should not be estopped, which makes a reviewing
court likely to permit retroactive effect. Retroactivity theory, on the
other hand, makes no such assumption. Thus, a reviewing court
may be more inclined to refuse retroactive effect under that
87 Professor Karl Llewellyn demonstrated, in an incisive article on statutory interpretation, that the canons of construction can be found in inconsistent pairs. Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1949). For example, although courts sometimes state that a
"statute cannot go beyond its text," they also state that to "effect its purpose a statute may
be implemented beyond its text." Id. at 401. In addition, courts sometimes indicate that
"punctuation will govern when a statute is open to two constructions," but thereafter will
state that "punctuation marks will not control the plain and evident meaning of language."
Id. at 405. See also Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHi. L. REv. 800, 805 (1983); Radin, supra note 67, at 873; Thomas, supra note 25, at 20810; Tunks, Assigning Legislative Meaning: A New Bottle, 37 IOWA L. REV. 372, 381 (1952);
Wald, Some Observationson the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA
L. REv. 195, 206-07 (1983).
88 See The Deference Rule, supra note 12, at 597-600.
89 See Llewellyn, supra note 87, at 401-06; The Deference Rule, supra note 12, at 590-602.
90 See cases cited at notes 22-23 supra.
91 See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra.
92 Compare text accompanying notes 21-32 supra with text accompanying notes 33-44
supra.
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theory. 93
Similar conflicts can be found between vagueness analysis and
retroactivity analysis. Vagueness analysis precludes the retroactive
application of an interpretation if the underlying regulation suffers
from impermissible levels of indefiniteness which prohibits sufficient notice. 94 Retroactivity analysis is also concerned with the
problem of notice, but it seemingly permits retroactive application
of a new law, notwithstanding notice problems, if the regulatory
interest is sufficient to warrant that result. 95 Thus, in the context of
regulatory interpretations, both the vagueness and retroactivity
analyses examine the same problem, but seem to prescribe different
review criteria.
B. Inadequacies
Current approaches are also inadequate because they fail to
give judges meaningful standards by which to decide retroactivity
issues. This is true of vagueness analysis. It is also true of retroactivity analysis. Although the Chenery96 test identifies the two major
components of retroactivity analysis, its standards are vague. The
test gives the lower courts little guidance about how to evaluate the
"ill effect" of, or the "regulatory interest" in, retroactivity. Instead,
the courts have substantial freedom to permit or deny retroactive
9 7
effect, and the outcome of a case depends on the judge's attitude
98
90
towards the public interests and the ill effect of retroactivity.
Some lower courts have partially remedied this deficiency in
the Chenety test by developing more precise standards for applying
93 Id.
94 See note 49 supra.
95 See notes 33-44 supra and accompanying text.
96 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
97 Some agencies fare worse under the balancing test than others. One agency that has
fared poorly is the NLRB. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 637, 655 n.14
(5th Cir. 1981); Drug Package, Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1340, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1978);
NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1966). Its troubles are partially attributable to the fact that it rarely uses notice and comment procedures when creating new legal requirements. Rather it creates those rules on an ad hoc basis in
administrative proceedings. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Majestic
Weaving, supra. Although this procedure is permissible, see Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294;
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947), courts are generally hostile to it because
of the potential for unfairness. See, e.g., Majestic Weaving, 355 F.2d at 860 ("There has been
increasing expression of regret over the Board's failure to react more positively to the
Supreme Court's rather pointed hint [in Chenery]" which encouraged the NLRB to use its
notice and comment procedures more routinely.). As a result, courts have been quite willing to invalidate NLRB interpretations on retroactivity grounds. Id.
98 See, e.g., Summit Nursing Home, Inc. v. United States, 572 F.2d 737, 743 (Ct. Cl.
1978); Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1081 (1st
Cir. 1977).
99 See, e.g., Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir. 1978); Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1335-39 (6th Cir. 1978); Louisiana v. Department of Energy, 507 F.
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the test. The leading decision, Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union
v. NLRB, 0 0° involved, like Chenery, administrative precedent. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit identified the
following factors as relevant to the problem of retroactivity:
(1) [w]hether the particular case is one of first impression,
(2) whether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from
well established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an
unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against
whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the
degree of the burden which a retroactive order imposes on a
party, and (5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard. 1 0 '
Although these factors improve the Chenery test, they do not identify
the full range of considerations. Nevertheless, the factors do improve the test and several courts have accepted and utilized
02
them.

C. Effects
The net effect of current federal court approaches to retroactivity is unclear. At times, they render regulatory requirements uncertain. The problem stems primarily from the courts' failure to
grapple with basic interpretive issues. It is difficult to anticipate
which interpretive rules will be applied in a given case and, therefore, difficult to predict how a regulation will be interpreted. But it
is also difficult to predict whether an interpretation, when ren0 3
dered, will be applied retroactively.1
Supp. 1365, 1376 (W.D. La. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Department of Energy v. Louisiana, 690
F.2d 180 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1333-34 (9th Cir. 1982),
presents an unusual application of the Chenery balancing test. Although the court concluded that the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) interpretation did not involve an abrupt departure from prior practice, it refused to apply the interpretation retroactively. The
court concluded that there was little public interest involved, and that the order imposed an
undue burden on the petitioner even though the agency did not impose penalties. The
court noted that the order permitted the application of penalties if petitioner failed to comply prospectively. The court held that this "penalty" was too severe because petitioner had
many stores, and any one might be found in noncompliance. Moreover, it noted that petitioner's competitors were not subject to similar orders, and thus the order placed petitioner
in an adverse competitive position. But see Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
100 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
101 Id. at 390.
102 See, e.g., Stewart Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846, 848-49 (10th Cir. 1983);
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1333-34 (9th Cir. 1982); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Department of Energy, 449 F. Supp. 760, 797-98 (D. Del. 1978). See also
McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1042-45 (5th Cir. 1981).
103 This uncertainty may be reduced by the presence of other factors. Once a regulatory
scheme has been in effect for some time, many interpreting problems are resolved. It is
also easier to predict how future problems will be resolved. But if the agency's regulatory
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Uncertainties about the possible meaning and application of
regulations can have important economic and regulatory implications. It is unclear what effect uncertainty has on the willingness of
the regulated party to comply with regulatory schemes. Indeed, the
effect may vary depending on the regulatory scheme, and the incentives created thereby, as well as on a myriad of other factors. In
some instances, uncertainty may encourage overcompliance by
causing companies to refrain from desirable economic activity
which may or may not be prohibited, for fear that it might be proscribed.104 In other instances, uncertainty may cause undercompliance because judges and agencies have broad discretion, not only
in how to interpret regulations but also in determining their retroactive effect. If an enforcement action results, the regulated person
may be able to avoid sanctions by persuading the reviewing court to
philosophy changes, it may render an unexpected interpretation. Moreover, when a new
scheme is involved, accurate predictions can be difficult. In the early 1970's, for example,
the Department of Energy's predecessor, the Cost of Living Council, promulgated the
Mandatory Petroleum Price Regulations which regulated the price at which crude oil and
refined petroleum products could be sold. Although this scheme was not entirely new,
since it was based in part on World War II price regulations, there was substantial uncertainty about its meaning and application. This uncertainty generated much litigation about
the meaning of the regulations; litigation that continues, even today, five years after the
regulations were terminated by Executive Order.
Of course, the mere fact that courts apply a diverse set of interpretive principles does
not render their results unpredictable. One can, if he understands the prevailing judicial
attitude towards interpretation, make a fairly accurate prediction about which interpretive
principles will be applied. One may be able to find patterns which indicate that certain
principles are used more frequently than others. But predictions can be hazardous when
federal administrative regulations are involved. The administrative agency may render initial interpretations, and it may be possible to ascertain the agency's regulatory bent and
anticipate its response to a given interpretive problem. But such predictions are sometimes
inaccurate, especially if the agency's regulatory philosophy changes or is modified. See The
Deference Rule, supra note 12, at 612-14.
If a court renders the initial interpretation, accurate prediction becomes quite difficult.
It is difficult to know before a suit is filed which judge will hear a case. One may plan to
manipulate a case so that it comes before a judge with a favorable bent, but that plan may
be thwarted. Even if the plan is successful and even if the judge gives a favorable interpretation, that interpretation may be overridden by an appellate court. One can base a prediction on general judicial attitudes toward interpretive problems, but this approach is
perilous. Although one may be able to correctly predict the bent of the Supreme Court, it
does not decide most cases. The hundreds of lower courtjudges may not have a prevailing
philosophy about interpretive problems. Even if such a prevailing philosophy existed, the
case might be decided by judges who do not adhere to that philosophy.
104 This tendency toward compliance is reflected in vagueness and overbreadth cases.
In such cases the concern is that the threat of sanctions will deter individuals from engaging
in constitutionally protected conduct. See Force, supra note 50, at 431 ("Concerning vagueness and overbreadth, specificity in legislation is a critical constitutional demand where it is
necessary ... to prevent people, in an abundance of caution, from abstaining from lawful
activities for fear of breaking the law."); Ratner, supra note 50, at 1085; Stickgold, Variations
on the Theme of Dombrowski v. Pfister: FederalIntervention in State CriminalProceedingsAffecting
First Amendment Rights, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 369, 378-80. The same principle applies, however, in other areas. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 424 (2d ed. 1972).
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adopt its own interpretation, or by persuading it not to apply the
agency's interpretation retroactively.' 0 5
III.
A.

Suggestions
A Review Model

In order to eliminate these deficiencies, the federal courts must
develop a principled approach to retroactivity problems. In order
to do so, they must resolve certain basic issues. Preliminary issues
are whether regulatory interpretations can create law and whether
they can have retroactive effect. As indicated previously, the courts
must resolve these issues affirmatively.106 It cannot be disputed
that the interpretive process is sometimes creative. Although the
degree of creativity may vary from case to case and from one interpretive problem to the next, its existence is an established fact. 10 7
Given that regulatory interpretations can create law, the courts
then must decide whether and to what extent they should be given
retroactive effect. One approach the courts could follow is to preclude all interpretations, newly announced or altered, from being
applied retroactively. This approach would protect settled expectations and insure that everyone receives fair notice of regulatory
requirements and has an opportunity to comply with those
requirements.
Such an absolute prohibition against retroactivity would be extreme. In many instances new or altered interpretations are not
novel or unanticipated, 108 and thus implicate only minimally the
concerns associated with retroactivity. Moreover, an absolute rule
105 Judge Posner notes that:
The incentive to obey a legal rule is, as we know, a function in part of the
probability that a violation will be punished. If the rule is vague, prospective violators will discount the punishment cost of the violation not only by the probability
that they will be caught but by the additional probability, significantly less than
one, that the rule will be held applicable to the specific conduct in which they
engaged. Thus the deterrent effect of the law is reduced.
R. POSNER, supra note 104, at 424 (footnotes omitted).
In several cases, judges purport to have observed such undercompliance. See, e.g.,
Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 177 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983): "Much less would we be inclined to [find unfairness,
unreasonableness, or any other element of estoppel] on the facts here presented in favor of
sophisticated oil field operators exploring the possibility of dubious regulatory leeway without even requesting an official interpretation." "[Pennzoil] knew from the regulations
themselves that only an official interpretation by the General Counsel's Office could furnish
any assurance for its course; it chose not to request one." 680 F.2d at 179. See also United
States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816, 848 (D.D.C. 1983) ("To estop the DOE would not
only frustrate.., important [national policy] objectives but would allow Exxon unjustly to
reap huge profits from its dubious exploration of the limits of regulatory tolerance.").
106 See text accompanying notes 24-32 supra.
107 Id.
108 See text accompanying notes 148-51 and 189-91 infra.
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against retroactivity would produce undesirable side effects. The
regulated person would be discouraged from seeking interpretive
guidance from the responsible agency. Until the agency or a court
announced an interpretation and gave fair notice of its existence,
the interpretation could not be applied to anyone. By seeking interpretive guidance, the regulated individual might alert the agency
to an interpretive problem and prompt it to render an undesired
interpretation.
Retroactivity is occasionally demanded by practical considerations. Problems may arise that were not anticipated by either the
agency or the regulated person, creating a need for prompt action.
Courts confronted by this problem adjudicate the issue, creating
new rules as necessary. Agencies are frequently forced to do likewise, as the Supreme Court recognized in Chenery.10 9 The Court
stated:
The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be
performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative
promulgation of rules to be applied in the future. But any rigid
requirement to that effect would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which arise....
In other words, problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems
which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general
rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with
a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture
within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the
agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a caseby-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective.' 10
This process of rule creation and retroactive application is not
always unfair. Unfairness depends on the extent to which the interpretation is novel and unanticipated, as well as on the severity of its
impact.
Retroactive application might be particularly necessary or appropriate when an initial interpretation proves to be totally unworkable or permits wholesale evasion of regulatory requirements. In
such a situation, it may be desirable to replace that interpretation
with a new one."'I It may also be appropriate to purge the initial
109 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
110 Id. at 202-03 (citations omitted).
11 See Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237, 240 (D.C. Cir.
1960):
But in most areas of law, the need for predictability must compete with the need
for change. Thus in reviewing legislation of retroactive effect, the virtues of stability must be balanced with the benefits of progress. Accordingly courts have often
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interpretation immediately, especially if it produces particularly
12
anomalous or undesirable results."
While retroactivity may be necessary in some situations, courts
still need to develop criteria for deciding when a retroactive effect
should be permitted. Courts should not continue to use numerous,
and at times inconsistent, approaches. They should start by abandoning the declaratory theory. It is outdated and simplistic. The
courts could use the estoppel theory, but it does not provide the
best approach. The notion that the government cannot be estopped is too deeply entrenched in the law,'1 3 and unduly encourages retroactivity. It forces courts to assume that the governmental
interest overrides any private injury that may result."14 Courts
upheld statutes which cut off or modified private contracts where it appeared that
the legislation sought to attain social purposes of greater importance than predictability and reliance.
See also Local 719, International Prod., Serv. & Sales Employees Union v. McLeod, 183 F.
Supp. 790, 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 463, 463-64 (1962); Slawson, supra note 4, at 225:
Almost as obvious, however, is the fact that reliance can never be absolute, since
the legal order must constantly change to fit new factual conditions or new conceptions of the common good. Reliance on existing rules, therefore, must be sacrificed to some extent to the need for change. It is this basic and simple conflict
that is often overlooked in writing on retroactivity.
112 See Griswold, supra note 13, at 413 ("[I]n the absence of long-continuedness, the
principle of non-retroactivity should yield to the necessities of the process of administrative
formulation of a sound rule."). The situation is similar to that encountered by judges when
they are forced to determine whether to give overruling precedent retroactive effect. Justice Traynor points out that:
A bad precedent is doubly evil because it has not only inflicted hardship but
threatens to continue doing so. When ajudge resolves at last to overrule it, however, he confronts the immediate problem of how much reliance the precedent
engendered. Reliance in one case of enormous repercussions? Reliance in many
cases of small but cumulatively strong repercussions? No serious reliance at all in
view of the mocking decisions attending a precedent? A judge is mindful that an
overruling is normally retroactive but also mindful of the traditional antipathy toward retroactive law that springs from its recurring association with injustice. He
must reckon with the possibility that a retroactive overruling could entail substantial hardship. He may nevertheless be impelled to make such an overruling if the
hardship it would impose upon those who have relied upon the precedent appear
not so great as the hardships that would inure to those who would remain saddled
with a bad precedent. An immediate consideration will be that statutes of limitations, by putting an end to old causes of action, markedly cut down the number of
possible hardship cases.
Traynor, supra note 21, at 540. See also Moody, supra note 14, at 443; Prospective Application,

supra note 24, at 471.
113 See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra and compare with text accompanying notes
33-44 supra.

114 See Heckler v. Community Health Serv. of Crawford, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2218, 2224
(1984):
When the government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its
agents have given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in
obedience to the rule of law is undermined. It is for this reason that ... the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant .... [W]e are
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could place more emphasis on an interpretation's private impact
and balance that impact against the regulatory interest. If that is
done, estoppel analysis merges with retroactivity analysis.' 15 Even
then, estoppel analysis would'not adequately respond to all retroactivity problems. Although that analysis may satisfactorily resolve
problems relating to second impression interpretations, it remains
6
inadequate when first impression interpretations are involved."1
The third approach, vagueness, may provide an adequate response. Indeed, the critical issue in most retroactivity cases is
whether those subject to a regulation had fair notice that it might7
be so interpreted. Vagueness analysis also focuses on this issue."
But the judicial attitude toward vagueness claims renders that analysis unacceptable as the primary approach. As noted above, courts
are extremely hostile to vagueness challenges except when the underlying regulation is being applied in a criminal context or implicates a fundamental constitutional right."18 Thus, even though
courts state that economic regulations must be sufficiently definite
so that those of ordinary intelligence can ascertain what they
mean, 19 in practice courts only inquire whether a provision is devoid of ascertainable standards. 120 One commentator, observing
the pronounced tendency of courts to reject vagueness challenges
hesitant ... to say that there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring
that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed
by the countervailing interest of some citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor and reliability in their dealings with their Government.
115 The Supreme Court has suggested that estoppel considerations underlie retroactivity analysis. See Heckler, 104 S. Ct. at 2224 n. 12 ("This principle [of estoppel] also underlies
the doctrine that an administrative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when to
do so would unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests."). But this statement is
questionable since estoppel cannot be applied to first impression interpretations. See note
45 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, even in cases of second impression interpretations, courts are less inclined to grant relief in estoppel cases than in retroactivity cases.
Courts treat the two theories as distinct and apply them differently.
116 See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
117 One potential objection to vagueness analysis is that it may not adequately respond
to the problem of second impression interpretations. Such interpretations present special
problems because, even though a regulation does not seem to be unduly vague or ambiguous on its face, those subject to the regulation may have been encouraged to rely on a prior
administrative interpretation. Vagueness analysis should be able to cope with this problem.
Courts routinely hold that administrative interpretations can alleviate vagueness problems,
and might similarly hold that such interpretations can exacerbate a provision's indefiniteness. Lower courts have held that agency confusion can provide evidence to buttress a
vagueness claim.
118 See text accompanying notes 52-65 supra.
119 See, e.g., Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); United States v.
Batson, 706 F.2d 657, 679 (5th Cir. 1983); Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 133536 (7th Cir. 1978); Brennan v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1974).
120 See, e.g., Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) ("It is true that this Court has
held the 'void for vagueness' doctrine applicable to civil as well as criminal actions ....
However, this is where 'the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard ... was so vague
and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all ....
'. This language is dicta
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in economic cases, noted that the few instances in which the doc2
trine has been applied can be explained as historical aberrations.' '
Although this view has been disputed, 122 it is clear that courts rarely
because the court concluded that it was unnecessary to reach the vagueness issue.);
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932):
These general words and phrases are so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their violation constitutes a denial of due process of law. It is not the
penalty itself that is invalid but the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard that
is so vague and indefinite as to be really no standard at all.
Several commentators agree. Collings points out that:
Some of the language in the Connally, Cohen Grocery, and Cline decisions seems to
suggest that a statute may be objectionable merely because of a possibility that
different juries may reach varying results in its application. As a result a makeweight argument is often advanced by defendants to the effect that a statute is
unconstitutionally vague because of the possibility of varying results. As might be
expected the Court makes short work of such contentions. Obviously few criminal
provisions would be constitutional if they were to be condemned merely because
in some borderline cases there would be no certainty as to the jury decision .... In
view of these cases one must conclude that the presence of difficult borderline or
peripheral cases will not invalidate a statute at least where there is a hard core of
circumstances to which the statute unquestionably applies and as to which the ordinary person would have no doubt as to its application.
Collings, supra note 49, at 205-06. Collings offers the following cases in support of his
conclusions: Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) ("difficulty in determining
whether certain marginal offenses are within the meaning of the language under attack as
vague does not automatically render a statute unconstitutional for indefiniteness"); United
States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 523 (1942) ("[The] mere fact that a penal statute is so
framed as to require ajury upon occasion to determine a question of reasonableness is not
sufficient to make it too vague to afford a practical guide to permissible conduct."); United
States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930):
Whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite
sides. The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can come near
it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to
the criminal law to make him take the risk.
121 Amsterdam points out that:
The primary thesis advanced here is that the doctrine of unconstitutional indefiniteness has been used by the Supreme Court almost invariably for the creation of
an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of several of the
Bill of Rights freedoms. With regard to one class of cases, those involving potential infringement of first amendment privileges, this buffer zone principle has always been expressly avowed in the Court's opinions and recognized by the
commentators .... [T]he "true" uncertainty cases... when seen in their historical
perspective.., date from an era when economic laissez faire was for the Court the
sanctum sanctorum that free speech has become today ....
Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 75-77 (footnotes omitted). See also Collings, supra note 49, at
213; Douglas, The Bill of Rights is Not Enough, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 207 (1963); Comment,
Legislation-Requirementof Definiteness in Statutory Standards, 53 HARV. L. REV. 264 (1954). The
doctrine was also invoked by the Warren Court. See Kurland, Egalitarianismand the W1arren
Court, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 629, 667 (1970) ("The Warren Court, in particular, had been more
stringent in imposing on the state legislatures and on Congress a duty to cross their t's and
dot their i's in their statutes lest they find those statutes struck down for vagueness.").
122 Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixingand Market Division, 74 YALE
L.J. 775, 844-45 (1965):
It has been suggested that the void-for-vagueness doctrine has usually been employed by the Supreme Court to create an added zone of protection around certain Bill of Rights freedoms. InternationalHarvester and Cohen are, under this view,
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invalidate economic regulations on vagueness grounds. 23 Most
24
courts reject vagueness claims after only perfunctory discussion,1
125
even when a very vague law is involved.
Since vagueness analysis is constitutionally mandated, it cannot
be ignored. But it can be supplemented by retroactivity analysis.
This supplementation is appropriate. Even though regulations may
not be "devoid of ascertainable standards," interpretations can still
be unanticipated and can perpetuate unfairness. 12 6 Retroactivity
analysis could dispel this unfairness. The process would entail two
steps. First, courts would examine a regulation to determine
whether it meets minimal levels of definiteness. If it does not,
courts could refuse to give it retroactive effect. If it does, they
could apply retroactivity analysis to determine whether it is fair or
appropriate to apply the interpretation retroactively.
This approach is consistent with the underpinnings of both
vagueness and retroactivity analyses. Vagueness analysis is constitutionally required by the due process clause.' 27 Retroactivity analysis, on the other hand, is not constitutionally required. 28 Rather,
reduced in large part to the status of historical curiosities left over from 'an era
when economic laissez faire was for the Court the sanctum sanctorum that free
speech has become today.' Since economic freedom is not noticeably a sanctum
sanctorum for the present Court, this theory may be read too broadly to mean that
uncertainty in an antitrust statute, even a criminal antitrust statute such as the
Sherman Act, would not today cause great concern, and, therefore, that Brandeis'
rule of reason might now be acceptable. The Court's 1963 decision in United
States v. National Dairy Products Corp., however, indicates that this is not the
case, and the Court continues to refuse to tolerate lack of standards, even in an
economic regulation.
In the latter case, National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. United States, 372 U.S. 29 (1963), the
Court did not invalidate the statute, but did narrow it by construction.
123 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
932 (1981); Precious Metals Assocs., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 620
F.2d 900, 906-07 (1st Cir. 1980); General Dynamics v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 464 (1st Cir.
1979).
124 See, e.g, Ray Evers Welding Co. v. OSHRC, 625 F.2d 726, 732 (6th Cir. 1980); McLean Trucking Co. v. OSHRC, 503 F.2d 8, 10-11 (4th Cir. 1974); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Brennan, 497 F.2d 230, 233-34 (5th Cir. 1974).
125 See, e.g., Brennan v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 869, 871-73 (10th Cir. 1974).
126 See text accompanying notes 25-32 supra.
127

See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10-8, at 512-13 (1978).

128 The earliest decision, at the federal level, is Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref.
Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1932). The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Montana
Supreme Court could reverse prior precedent, but could apply the reversal only prospectively. The Court concluded, in dicta, that a court could apply new precedent retroactively
although a party may have relied on the prior precedent. Justice Cardozo noted that:
"This is not a case where a court in overruling an earlier decision has given to the new
ruling a retroactive bearing, and thereby has made invalid what was valid in the doing.
Even that may often be done, though litigants not infrequently have argued to the contrary." Id. at 364.
Although the Sunburst case involved a state court decision, similar decisions have been
rendered regarding the validity of federal judicial precedent. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Hu-
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courts apply it as a matter of judicial discretion.129 Indeed, when
retroactivity analysis developed, the debate centered on whether it
was constitutionally permissible, 130 rather than on whether it was
constitutionally compelled. 3 1 Thus, although a regulation satisfies
son, 404 U.S. 97, 105-07 (1971). Moreover, the Supreme Court has extended this analysis
to regulatory precedent. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
The Court supported Cardozo's statements in Sunburst in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 628-29 (1965). The Court confronted the question of whether its own precedent in
the criminal procedure area should be applied retroactively. In resolving that issue, the
Court applied a Chenery-like test which it derived from Sunburst. It went on to note that this
test was neither constitutionally compelled nor constitutionally prohibited:
It is true that heretofore, without discussion, we have applied new constitutional
rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule. Petitioner contends
that our method of resolving these prior cases demonstrates that an absolute rule
of retroaction prevails in the area of constitutional adjudication. However, we
believe that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect.
As Justice Cardozo said, "We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the
subject."
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits
and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation. We believe that this approach is particularly correct with reference to
the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions as to unreasonable searches and seizures.
Rather than "disparaging" the Amendment we but apply the wisdom of Justice
Holmes that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
Holmes, The Common Law 5 (Howe ed. 1963).
Id. at 628-29 (footnotes omitted). However, the Court's statement that retroactivity analysis is not constitutionally compelled is dicta.
129 Several lower court decisions support this view of retroactivity. See Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ("as a matter of equitable discretion, courts will apply ajudgment overruling a prior decision only prospectively in
order to avoid gross injustice"); NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141, 148-49 (9th
Cir. 1952):
Courts, in making ad hoc adjudications, regularly apply rules and doctrines not
previously announced, to prior conduct of the parties. On occasions they have
chosen to exercise an inherent power to give their pronouncements prospective
operation only, but they are not required by any constitutional limitation to do so,
and they ordinarily do not. We assume that an adjudication by an administrative
board is likewise not limited to prospective operation only by any fundamental
requirement of due process.
See also United States v. Rundle, 255 F. Supp. 936, 949-50 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
130 Since the Constitution only permits the federal courts to hear "cases and controversies," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, it was questionable whether a court could announce a new
rule and give it purely prospective effect. See Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts". Techniques
of Prospective Overruling,42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631 (1967). By giving a new rule purely prospective effect, the court may be rendering what is tantamount to an advisory opinion, something which is prohibited. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). Even
Cardozo, who developed the technique of prospective overruling, felt compelled to address
the issue of its constitutionality. Address by Benjamin Cardozo before the New York State
Bar Ass'n, Jan. 22, 1932, 55 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N. REP. 263, 295 (1932) [hereinafter cited as
Cardozo Address].
131 Cardozo suggested a resolution to the problem: a court applies the old rule in the
case before it, and announces the new rule as dicta. Thus, the new rule is not binding in the
sense that it resolves the initial case. But it does give warning as to how similar problems
will be resolved in the future, and thereby eliminates allegations that subsequent applica-
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constitutional requirements, courts remain free to deny retroactive
effect to interpretations of that regulation when discretionary considerations demand it.
Vagueness and retroactivity analyses do overlap somewhat.
The same remedies are available for both theories. Under retroactivity analysis, if a court decides that it is inequitable to apply a new
interpretation retroactively, it holds that the interpretation may
only be applied prospectively.13 2 This same remedy can be used, in
appropriate cases, under a vagueness analysis. If the court does not
invalidate the regulation on its face, it holds that the interpretation
is invalid as applied because those subjected to it were not given
fair notice. 3 3 The interpretation can still be applied in the future
to those who were given fair notice. Moreover, after the court's
decision, all should have notice as to the interpretation.
The need for, and impact of, retroactivity analysis will vary. In
the economic context, where vagueness review is minimal, it may
have a significant impact. On the other hand, when interpretations
impinge on first amendment rights or involve criminal sanctions,
retroactivity analysis may have little effect. Retroactivity analysis requires a stricter analysis in these situations, and may make it more
difficult to sustain a retroactive effect. But vagueness analysis
demands higher levels of definiteness and notice as well. Thus, retroactivity analysis primarily affects interpretations of economic regulations and as such, it is arguably unnecessary. Vagueness analysis
provides less protection to economic interests because they merit
less protection. But even economic interests deserve fair notice of
regulatory requirements. 3 4 As a practical matter, most courts detions of the new rule were unanticipated. See Cardozo Address, supra note 130, at 295. See
also Note, Prospectivity and Retroactivity of Supreme Court ConstitutionalInterpretations,5 U. RIcH.
L. REv. 129, 130-31 (1970).
132 In the administrative area, courts normally use only one of two options: they give
the interpretation retroactive effect, or they give it prospective effect. Courts will, in applying retroactivity analysis to their own precedent, sometimes exercise a third option: apply
the new rule to the case before it, but otherwise apply the rule prospectively. See Moody,
supra note 14. This approach makes the new rule binding and not merely dicta.
133 If a court concludes that a provision is constitutionally vague or indefinite, it may
invalidate the regulation, either on its face or as applied, depending on the interpretation's
impact. If the court invalidates the interpretation as applied, the interpretation may still be
applied prospectively. The court's decision only precludes the interpretation's retroactive
application. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Reed v. Lane, 759 F.2d 618, 622-23 (7th Cir.
1985); Logan v. Auger, 428 F. Supp. 396, 403 (S.D. Iowa 1977). See also Amsterdam, supra
note 49, at 109; Note, Void For Vagueness: An Escape From Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. LJ.
272, 273 (1948).
134 Collings, supra note 49, points out that:
Unquestionably the consequences of protecting the civil liberties of Communists and purveyors of lewd books and motion pictures is to further the civil liberties of us all. But are not economic liberties also important? Business men and
corporations perform useful functions. Why not also require definiteness in statutes relating to them? Certainly no one can quarrel with the principle that any
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mand fair notice even when interpretations have purely economic
effect. When courts are confronted with retroactive interpretations
which perpetrate unacceptable levels of unfairness, they find a way
to invalidate the retroactive effect. Although they may accomplish
that result through retroactivity analysis, they sometimes accomplish it by rejecting the interpretation through an indirect
challenge.13 5
This is not to suggest that the indirect challenges should be
discarded. Courts can, and undoubtedly do, retain the authority to
consider the basic issues presented by those challenges: whether
an interpretation is correct, and whether it should be given deference., 3 6 But the courts should resolve these issues without considering the potential retroactive effect of an interpretation. Even
though a court decides to defer to an interpretation, it can remedy
that effect by decreeing that the interpretation may only be applied
prospectively.
The tendency of some courts to invalidate interpretations,
rather than merely refuse retroactive effect, has an adverse impact
on the administrative process. If, because of concerns about an
interpretation's potential retroactive effect, a court strikes down an
administrative interpretation and substitutes its own, the agency
cannot apply the later interpretation even to future transactions. In
order to adopt that interpretation which may have been permissible
under the regulation, the agency must amend the original rule. It
would be preferable for the court to rule on the validity of the interpretation as a preliminary matter, uninfluenced by its retroactive
effect. 137 Then, if retroactive application is unwarranted, the court
statute whether criminal or civil should be sufficiently certain to inform those subject to it of the conduct which is required and to guide the judge and jury in its
application.
Id. at 233.
135 See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 175 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1982); Sauder v. Department of Energy, 648 F.2d 1341, 1346 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1981).
136 See The Deference Rule, supra note 12, at 587, 606-07. However, the indirect challenges
should be applied in a coherent and principled manner. Courts should not continue to
apply a diverse set of interpretive rules that permit and encourage inconsistent decisionmaking. Instead, they should develop a sound interpretive process. In order to do so, they
must first resolve several basic issues. First, they must develop principles on which to base
the process. See generally An Overview, supra note 12. Second, they must decide whether, and
to what extent, administrative interpretations should be given deference. See generally The
Deference Rule, supra note 12. Finally, they must reconcile the concept of deference with
other rules of construction. Id. at 597-600.
137 See American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416
(1967), where the Court stated:
We agree that the Commission, faced with new developments or in light of reconsideration of the relevant facts and its mandate, may alter its past interpretation
and overturn past administrative rulings and practice ....
In fact, although we
make no judgment as to the policy aspects of the Commission's action, this kind of
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could refuse it.138
B. Evaluation Criteria
If courts choose to apply retroactivity analysis to regulatory interpretations, they must develop more precise standards for determining when retroactivity should be permitted. The standards
articulated by the Supreme Court in Chenery, the "ill effect of retroactivity" and the "regulatory interest" in applying the interpretation retroactively, identify the proper criteria. t3 9 They are,
however, vague and inadequate. The factors articulated by the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the Retail, Wholesale case
improve upon the Chenery standards, but remain inadequate.
Although more precise standards are desirable, they are difficult to
formulate. Circumstances may vary significantly from case to case
and force courts to use a generalized balancing test. Such a test
leaves judges with broad discretion. Some attempt can be made,
however, to identify criteria which should limit or control the exercise of that discretion.
1. The "Ill Effect" of the Retroactivity
The "ill effect" prong of the Chenery balancing test should be
subject to several qualifications and limitations. Retroactive applications of regulatory interpretations can result in ill effects because
they can defeat a person's expectations about a regulation's meaning and application. The mere fact that one has an "expectation"
does not mean, however, that it deserves protection. Some expectations are legitimate, and therefore worthy of protection, while
others are not. Courts must evaluate the legitimacy of the expectation as well as the severity of the interpretation's impact, and balance these determinations against the regulatory interest advanced
by the agency.
As a threshold matter, a person should be required to demonstrate that he actually had certain expectations about a regulation's
meaning which were different from the challenged interpretation,
flexibility and adaptability to changing needs and patterns of transportation is an
essential part of the office of a regulatory agency. Regulatory agencies do not
establish rules of conduct to last forever; they are supposed, within the limits of
the law and of fair and prudent administration, to adapt their rules and practices to
the Nation's needs in a volatile, changing economy. They are neither required nor
supposed to regulate the present and the future within the inflexible limits of
yesterday.
See also Moody, supra note 14, at 493; Prospective Application, supra note 24, at 471.
138 See text accompanying notes 33-44 supra.
139 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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and that he relied on those expectations.1 40 Litigants who made no
attempt to ascertain the regulatory requirements will not satisfy this
requirement.1 4 1 Moreover, litigants who were intent on a particular
course of conduct regardless of the law will not satisfy the requirement either.1 4 2 In these instances, a court may apply an interpretation retroactively. The retroactivity does not impinge on reliance
140 For example, in Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. NLRB,
727 F.2d 1184, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court stated:
Neither does the union fare well on the third factor-reliance. The union's superseniority clause was last modified in 1975, the year in which Dairyleawas decided.
There is no evidence that the union considered, much less relied on, Dairylea in
writing this clause. Local 900 would have us infer reliance on Limpco and Otis Elevator simply because those cases allowed superseniority for recording secretaries.
In affirming the Board's decision in Limpco, however, the Third Circuit found it
crucial that the officer participated in grievance processing ....
a fact not present
here, and Otis Elevator was not reviewed by a court. Any reliance the union may
have placed on those decisions, therefore-remembering that none was shownwas not altogether well placed.
In Marks v. Higgins, 213 F.2d 884, 889 (2d Cir. 1954), the court noted that:
The facts here show an absence of reasonable reliance by the settlor on the 1934
ruling, even if it be considered valid. For, as already noted, previous to his death,
... two regulations... superseded the 1934 ruling, and specifically interpreted the
statute as covering a trust containing a contingent life estate of the kind he reserved. The settlor thus had ample warning, and had ample time, to divest himself
of his contingent life interest.
See also Elkins v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 669, 681-82 (1983) (The tax court decided that the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue's interpretation of a provision could not be retroactively applied against someone who had relied on that interpretation. However, the court
refused to grant summary judgment because there remained the question of whether petitioner had, in fact, relied.); Corr, supra note 8, at 773-79.
141 Most discussions of the problem have involved reliance on overruled judicial precedent. On that subject Justice Cardozo stated his "impression that the instances of honest
reliance and genuine disappointment are rarer than are commonly supposed to be by those
who exalt the virtues of stability and certainty." Cardozo Address, supra note 130, at 295.
See also Prospective Overruling, supra note 2, at 945-46:
[T]he element of surprise will not realistically be an operative factor in a great
many cases because the parties will have acted without any knowledge at all of
what the governing law was; whatever law is finally held to govern their conduct,
whether it be the old rule or the new rule, will be a new rule to them. This is
something of what Cardozo meant when he wrote, "The picture of the bewildered
litigant lured into a course of action by the false light of a decision, only to meet
ruin when the light is extinguished and the decision is overruled, is for the most
part a figment of excited brains."
142 See NLRB v. National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525, 534 (2d Cir. 1954):
Moreover, National's claimed reliance on the old waiver rule is not supported by
the record. In addition, National, in its exceptions to the Regional Director's report of the objections to the election, filed several months after the contract with
Local 444 was entered into, did not assert that the objections had been waived by
Local I, but merely contended that they were not supported by substantial evidence; and, instead of requesting a dismissal of the objections as being filed too
late, National requested a hearing on the merits. Local 444 makes no claim that it
relied on the Board's waiver rule. In the absence of reliance upon such rule,
neither National nor Local 444 can show prejudice by reason of the change of the
rule.
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interests. 14 3
Several commentators have questioned the desirability of the
actual reliance requirement. 14 4 One objection raised is that this requirement deprives the law of predictability because a law might be
applied one way when there is no reliance, and another way when
there is reliance. Although this analysis is correct in that an interpretation might be applied in differing ways depending on whether
or not reliance exists, this does not make the law unpredictable.
Those who seek to learn the law's requirements and to act accordingly will find that the law is relatively predictable. Predictability is
only important to those who seek to learn the law and to act according to its dictates. Those who do so deserve, and receive, more
protection under retroactivity analysis. On the other hand, those
who have acted without regard for regulatory requirements have
evidenced a lack of regard for the law's predictability. In this latter
situation, the public's interest in applying the interpretation retroactively should predominate.
A second objection raised is that the reliance requirement
tends to encourage litigation, thus consuming judicial time in
resolving expectation claims. Although this objection is correct in
some cases, the consumption may be justifiable. In some instances,
litigation will occur under the regulations, and the retroactivity issue will be merely one of many issues to be resolved. Furthermore,
the public interest may justify this expenditure ofjudicial resources.
As discussed in the prior paragraph, the law may appropriately disThese problems also arise with retroactively applied statutes. See Slawson, supra note 4,
at 219. See also Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 721 (1974). In giving
retroactive effect to a statute, the Court noted, inter alia, that:
Even assuming a degree of uncertainty in the law at that time regarding the
Board's constitutional obligations, there is no indication that the obligation under
§ 718 (to pay attorneys' fees], if known, rather than simply the common-law availability of an award, would have caused the Board to order its conduct so as to
render this litigation unnecessary and thereby preclude the incurring of such costs.
Id. at 721.
143 One who claims to have relied on an alternate interpretation of the law should be
subject to discovery on that issue. In Exxon Corp. v. Department of Energy, 91 F.R.D. 26,
41 (N.D. Tex. 1981), Exxon claimed that its interpretation, which was different than the one
ultimately adopted by the agency, had been formulated in good faith reliance on existing
interpretive materials. The Department responded with discovery requests designed to test
Exxon's assertions. Exxon, which as it turned out had not acted in good faith, sought to
resist discovery on the basis that the requested documents were protected by the attorneyclient privilege. The court ordered discovery, however, noting that Exxon's assertions of
good faith waived the privilege. See United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816, 848
(D.D.C. 1983).
144 Some commentators have argued that the actual reliance requirement is unsound.
See Schaefer, supra note 130, at 642-43. See also Prospective Application, supra note 24, at 479;
Prospective Overruling,supra note 2, at 949; Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutionalor OverrulingPriorDecisions, 60 HARV. L. REv. 437, 440 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as Prospective Operation].
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tinguish between those who have relied on the prior state of the law
and those who have not, and only provide relief to the former.
Moreover, if the actual reliance issue becomes too cumbersome because of, for example, proof problems, administrative officials may
choose not to press it. But they should have the option of pressing
that issue before the court as circumstances warrant.
Once a person demonstrates that he has expectations about a
regulation's meaning, a reviewing court must examine those expectations to determine whether they are reasonable. Thus, at the
minimum, a court should require a litigant to show that the
1 4 5 If
agency's interpretation "changed" the law in some manner.
the challenged interpretation does not affect the law, but is merely
the latest in a long series of interpretations all reaching the same
result, 4 6 it is entitled to little protection. Demonstrating that an
interpretation "changed" the law would not be difficult in most
cases. As noted above, when an interpretation qualifies, expands,
14 7
or restricts a regulation, it can be treated as law creating.
Even though an interpretation may alter the law, it may have
been unreasonable to rely on an alternate interpretation. If the interpretation is one of first impression, private expectations will be
unreasonable if the person should have anticipated the agency's interpretation. Frequently, a new interpretation is not novel in any
sense. Rather, it is presaged by the regulation's language and regulatory history, 48 judicial or administrative precedent, 14 9 or by prior
145 See Corr, supra note 8, at 763.
146

See Prospective Operation, supra note 144, at 441.

147 See text accompanying notes 25-32 supra. When an interpretation overrules a prior
interpretation and substitutes a new rule in its place, law has been created. It can be argued
that a prior interpretation which is merely administrative, and not yet approved by a court,
does not constitute law. Courts are not required to accept administrative interpretations,
but when they do ratify such an interpretation, it becomes "law."
148 See Department of Energy v. Louisiana, 690 F.2d 180, 191 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983):
There is nothing confusing in the wording as applied to our specific problem.
Plaintiffs knew that they were using a different interpretation in determining
whether the oil being produced was old or new.... The history of the regulations,
rulings and interpretations demonstrates that there was no justification for their
position.
See also Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 175 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1982) (The court adopted the agency's interpretation of a regulation and applied that interpretation retroactively. Pennzoil's assertion that retroactive application would be unfair
was rejected because the interpretation was implicit in the regulatory scheme.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1190 (1983); Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The
criteria that the review panel relied upon seem to us entirely reasonable glosses on the term
'community essentiality.' They are not such a new departure that they could not reasonably
have been foreseen.").
149 See Saint Francis Memorial Hosp. v. United States, 648 F.2d 1305, 1311 (Ct. CI.
1981):
There is no evidence, and we have no reason to believe, that Saint Francis made
any such inquiry, but the fact is that the Secretary had already expressed his opin-
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agency action. 150 If the interpretation is not novel, then, absent
other circumstances, a person's reliance claim is not compelling.' 5 1
Not all interpretations are foreshadowed by regulatory history,
precedent, or agency action. A regulation may suffer from vagueness or ambiguity, and the responsible agency may not have taken
any position regarding its meaning and application. Those subject
to the regulation are, therefore, faced with uncertainty. The Retail,
Wholesale factors152 suggest that, in this situation, retroactivity is
generally unobjectionable. This conclusion is probably correct because the regulated person faced with uncertainty can protect himself' 53 by seeking interpretive guidance from the responsible
54
agency. 1
ion plainly on the precise issue in Intermediary Letter No. 51.... The strong
likelihood is that, if plaintiff had made proper inquiry, the intermediary or the
Department would have responded that the Secretary expressly considered capitalization the proper method to account for the interest paid during the construction period for Saint Francis' replacement facility. If plaintiff had thus discovered
the Secretary's position-as we think it should and would have-it could have
taken the steps it now says it would have taken if it had earlier learned the Secretary's view ....
150 See EEOC v. Puget Sound Log Scaling & Grading Bureau, 752 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir.
1985) (In interpreting a statute rather than a regulation, the court found the reliance unreasonable because a prior administrative interpretation signaled the agency's ultimate position. Moreover, holdings of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts on related
matters warned of the interpretation that was retroactively applied.). See also Prospective Operation, supra note 144, at 441.
151 This statement is undercut by the fact that the interpretive process is frequently unpredictable. See notes 12-13 supra.
152 See text accompanying note 101 supra.
153 See, e.g., Cheshire Hosp. v. New Hampshire-Vermont Hospitalization Serv., 689 F.2d
1112, 1122 (1st Cir. 1982) (appellant relied on what it claimed was the settled industry
interpretation of a regulation; the court concluded that "even if there was a settled industry
understanding, this understanding could not be transformed into settled law in the absence
of some indication that the Secretary concurred in this understanding"); Pennzoil Co. v.
Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 173-74 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), cert. dismissed,
459 U.S. 1190 (1983): "[Appellant suggests that] if there are two reasonable interpretations of a regulation, only the alternative selected by the regulated entity, and not the one
selected by the agency, may be given retroactive effect by the courts." The court rejected
appellant's contention, noting that:
[To deny deference in accepting the agency's interpretation simply because another interpretation, strained or not, was indulged in by an operator out of selfinterest would substitute for the rule of deference to agency action a rule of deference to that of a producer. This would stand the rule of deference literally on its
head.
Id. at 174; Saint Francis Memorial Hosp. v. United States, 648 F.2d 1305, 1311 (Ct. Cl.
1981) ("Reliance on one's own interpretation of an imprecise regulation does not create an
entitlement based on that interpretation, or a violation of due process when the administrator or court adopts another reading.").
154 Saint Francis Memorial Hosp. v. United States, 648 F.2d 1305, 1311 (Ct. Cl. 1981):
We believe that, faced as it was with a new problem for which the regulations did
not give any clear answer and the opposing position had real substance, plaintiff
could not proceed on its own without taking the chance that the Secretary might
later adopt the different view (and the courts uphold it). Plaintiff should, at the
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The obligation to seek guidance from the agency is fully consistent with the requirement, imposed by most regulatory schemes,
that those subject to a regulation take affirmative steps to ascertain
its meaning. 15 5 Moreover, the alternative of allowing the regulated
person to adopt and rely on his own interpretations would encourage manipulation of, and undercompliance with, regulatory
56
requirements. 1
The duty of inquiry, however, should not be imposed in all instances.' 5 7 Situations will arise in which no doubt exists as to a
least, have made an inquiry to its intermediary or the Secretary, seeking clarification or amplification of the statute and regulations.
See Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1337 (6th Cir. 1978) ("a duty of inquiry may
properly be imposed on those engaged in business enterprises, as they should be alert to
the probability that their conduct is of interest to one or more administrative agencies").
See also Department of Energy v. Louisiana, 690 F.2d 180, 191 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982)
("[Plaintiffs] never sought an agency interpretation to sustain their position. Rather, they
seem to have proceeded on the theory that their interpretation was reasonable and that it
would afford them protection against such a claim as now being made by the DOE. This, of
course, is no defense."), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
An exception exists for those rare regulatory schemes which give participants discretion to determine how their requirements should be applied. In Kentucky v. Secretary of
Educ., 717 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Bennett v. Kentucky Dep't of Educ., 105
S. Ct. 1544 (1985), a federal statute and implementing regulations provided funds for "educationally deprived children." It also provided that states could only use those funds to
supplement, not supplant, state and local funds used for that purpose. 717 F.2d at 944.
The Commonwealth designed special readiness classrooms for its deprived children in
which the per pupil expenditure was less than normal, but the overall cost was greater. The
Commonwealth did not eliminate any other programs for these students. Id. at 946.
The Secretary of Education concluded that Kentucky's program was not consistent
with the statute and regulations. However, the Sixth Circuit refused to give the Secretary's
interpretation retroactive effect. The court noted that the regulatory requirements were
not sufficiently clear or definite as to whether the Commonwealth had been given a specific
grant of discretion to develop and administer programs it believed to be consistent with the
Act, and that the Commonwealth's interpretation was a reasonable one. The court also
noted that there was no evidence of bad faith. Id. at 948.
155 See Heckler v. Community Health Serv. of Crawford County, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2218,
2226 (1984) ("As a participant in the Medicare program, respondent had a duty to familiarize itself with the legal requirements for cost reimbursement."); Emery Mining Corp. v.
Secretary of Labor, 744 F.2d 1411, 1416 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Particularly where mandatory
safety standards are concerned, a mine operator must be charged with knowledge of the
Act's provisions and has a duty to comply with those provisions."); Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1337 (6th Cir. 1978).
156 See text accompanying note 105 supra. See also Mishkin, supra note 14, at 72.
157 See New England Power Co. v. NRC, 683 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982). Under prior practice, an application for a permit would not incur a processing fee if it were withdrawn. In
1978, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a new fees regulation. It did not
expressly mention withdrawn applications, but the agency construed the regulation as allowing it to assess fees against such applications. The First Circuit held that the agency's
interpretation, although permissible, could not be retroactively applied; the agency's actions did not give adequate notice that the regulation changed prior practice and allowed
the imposition of fees on withdrawn applications. See also Cheshire Hosp. v. New Hampshire-Vermont Hosp. Serv., 689 F.2d 1112, 1120-21 (Ist Cir. 1982). In Cheshire Hospital,the
court rejected the retroactivity claim. Cheshire asserted that it had relied on a "clear, unambiguous and settled understanding" of the meaning of the regulation. Proferred evi-
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provision's meaning: the regulation does not suffer from facial
vagueness or ambiguity, and subsequent events have not revealed
indefiniteness. 58 It can be argued that the regulated person should
still seek regulatory guidance. But that solution is impractical.
When a complicated regulatory scheme with numerous regulatory
provisions is involved, a person cannot be expected to seek guidance on the meaning of each and every provision. Such a requirement would be time consuming and burdensome. Rather, the
burden of inquiry should apply only when circumstances suggest
that the regulation's meaning is in doubt.' 59
Even when inquiry is appropriate, those who request guidance
from an agency may not receive it. The agency may not respond, or
it may fail to do so in a timely manner, leaving the regulated person
to guess which interpretation the agency will adopt. That person
has a significant chance of guessing incorrectly, especially if the regulation is vague or ambiguous, and the agency has vacillated regarding its meaning. 160 Ultimately, if the regulated person relies
dence included testimony of an accountant about the settled understanding of those in the
industry and a letter from a fiscal intermediary which was in accord. Moreover, the agency
did not issue its interpretation until several years later.
158 In the criminal area, the Supreme Court has recognized that judicial expansion of
seemingly precise language can violate due process:
[There is] a potentially greater deprivation of the right to fair notice ... where the
claim is that a statute precise on its face has been unforeseeably and retroactively
expanded by judicial construction, than in the typical "void for vagueness" situation. When a statute on its face is vague or overbroad, it at least gives a potential
defendant some notice, by virtue of this very characteristic, that a question may
arise as to its coverage, and that it may be held to cover his contemplated conduct.
When a statute on its face is narrow and precise, however, it lulls the potential
defendant into a false sense of security, giving him no reason even to suspect that
conduct clearly outside the scope of the statute as written will be retroactively
brought within it by an act of judicial construction.
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964). See also Pierce v. United States, 314
U.S. 306, 311 (1941); Cohen v. Katsaris, 530 F. Supp. 1092, 1095-97 (N.D. Fla. 1982).
159 Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1337 (6th Cir. 1978):
Further, we are aware that a duty of inquiry may properly be imposed on those
engaged in business enterprises, as they should be alert to the probability that
their conduct is of interest to one or more administrative agencies. But, on the
undisputed facts of this case, we are unable to see how such a duty of inquiry could
have been triggered. Whether an employer looked to the language of the regulations or to industry practice, it would have been led to believe that press brakes
had been specifically exempted from guarding requirements. To hold that. in
these circumstances the employer should nonetheless have been put on notice by a
general guarding requirement which was applicable to all machines, and which
made no mention of press brakes, would be to indulge a fiction having little relation to reality. "[G]reat caution should be used not to let fiction deny the fair play
that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact." ... Adhering to the
facts here, we believe that the regulations were insufficient to warn employers that
guarding of press brakes was required.
160 SeeJ.L. Fond Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 687 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1982) (The Commissioners had previously disagreed about the proper interpretation of a regulation, but later
agreed. The court refused to allow the Commission to apply the agreed upon interpretation
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on a fair interpretation, the courts should afford the individual
some protection under the Chenery test. 16 1 Although it can be difficult to determine what constitutes a fair construction given that
courts have no set principles which govern the interpretive process,
several suggestions can be offered. The chosen interpretation
should conform to the regulation's language 6 2 and expressed purpose. 163 In addition, the regulated person should take into account
judicial and administrative precedent construing similar terms. 64
Courts should be reluctant, even in the absence of administrative guidance, to allow regulated persons to rely on settled industry
practice in interpreting a regulation. Although the regulated person may have little else to look to, relying on industry practice
raises potential problems. These problems are evident in vagueness
challenges raised against the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission's protective equipment regulation.165 The agency
has decreed that this regulation should be interpreted according to
whether "a reasonably prudent person familiar with the circumstances of the industry would have protected against this

hazard."

166

Some courts have held that this standard makes industry practice controlling when determining the meaning of a regulation, and
have invalidated agency attempts to impose other interpretations. 167 Most courts, however, do not treat industry practice as
controlling for fear that the industry as a whole may be undercomplying. Rather, they consider industry practice as merely one factor
which bears on the vagueness question.1 68 This approach is sound
retroactively because of the agency's prior vacillation, and because that vacillation had exacerbated the regulation's indefiniteness.).
161 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029, 1065 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1978); Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1337 (6th Cir. 1978). But
see Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
162

See An Overview, supra note 12, at 708-09.

163 Id. at 694-99.
164 Id. at 708-28.
165 The regulation states that "protective equipment, including personal protective
equipment .

.

. shall be provided, used and maintained .

.

. wherever it is necessary by

reason of hazards of processes or environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a) (1982).
166 Cape and Vineyard Div. of New Bedford Gas v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st
Cir. 1975) (citing National Realty & Contr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 (D.C. Cir.
1973)).
167 New Bedford Gas, 512 F.2d at 1152. See also B & B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583
F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1978).
168 Voegele Co. v. OSHRC, 625 F.2d 1075, 1076 (3rd Cir. 1980); General Dynamics v.
OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 464 (Ist Cir. 1979);
No other circuit has adopted the Fifth Circuit test [adopted in B & B Insulation of
treating industry practice as controlling in determining what a reasonable person
would expect a regulation to mean]. Instead, other courts have evaluated the custom and practice of the industry as one aspect of the reasonable person test.
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and should be used in determining retroactivity questions. When a
regulation's meaning is uncertain, a court may consider settled industry practice in determining whether a person's interpretation is
reasonable. Of course, the weight given to such a practice depends
on whether it is consistent with the regulation's language and purpose, as well as with other indicia of administrative intent.
As the Retail, Wholesale factors169 suggest, second impression
interpretations are more likely to impinge on legitimate reliance interests than first impression interpretations.1 7 0 When an agency issues an official interpretive ruling, those subject to the ruling are
coerced into compliance unless they are willing to make an immediate legal challenge or adopt their own interpretation and face the
possibility of an enforcement action. Thus, when an agency
revokes its ruling and substitutes an inconsistent one, a significant
possibility exists that the agency will upset legitimate expec1 71
tations.
Some regulatory schemes provide a remedy for the problem of
second impression interpretations. For example, Congress inThese courts have refused to limit the reasonable person test to the custom and
practice of the industry because "[s]uch a standard would allow an entire industry
to avoid liability by maintaining inadequate safety ....
We find this policy reason
for not making industry standards determinative to be quite compelling.
Voegele Co., 625 F.2d at 1078;Jensen Const. Co. of Okla., Inc. v. OSHRC, 597 F.2d 246, 248
(10th Cir. 1979).
169 See text accompanying note 101 supra.
170 See, e.g., Stewart Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1983); Pederson v.
NLRB, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956). Although the Pederson case did not involve a regulatory
interpretation, it provides a good illustration nonetheless. The NLRB has discretionary
power to refuse to consider matters within its statutory jurisdiction. The Board asserted
jurisdiction over petitioner's employer, and subpoenaed petitioner to testif4 in a pending
matter. Later, the employer fired petitioner for his testimony. Petitioner filed an unfair
labor practice charge, but the Board dismissed the charge based on a policy decision not to
accept jurisdiction over companies such as the petitioner's employer. The Second Circuit
reversed, noting that the Board originally asserted jurisdiction and forced petitioner to testify, and therefore was obligated to protect him against retaliatory action. See also NLRB v.
Atkinson, 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952) (The NLRB had previously refused jurisdiction over
matters involving the building and trade industry. The Board changed its policy and asserted jurisdiction over appellee who was involved in that industry, charging it with an unfair labor practice. The Ninth Circuit refused to assert jurisdiction retroactively.); K. DAvis,
supra note 25, § 7.23, at 116; Griswold, supra note 13, at 413-14; The Deference Rule, supra
note 12, at 620-22.
171 See, e.g., Stewart Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1983); McDonald
v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1981); Runnells v. Andrus, 484 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (D.
Utah 1980). These cases involved the Bureau of Land Management's oil and gas leasing
regulations. Under those regulations, agents frequently submitted offers. For years, they
were allowed to affix a client's signature with a rubber stamp. Then, in an adjudicative
decision, the Bureau held that this practice was unacceptable. The Bureau decided that if
an offer was signed by an agent or an attorney-in-fact, it must be accompanied by a signed
statement setting forth the agency or attorney status. The Bureau applied the decision to
previously submitted offers. All three Federal courts refused to sustain the Bureau's action.
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cluded a good faith defense in the Truth-In-Lending Act.' 7 2 This

defense applies to interpretations of both the Act and the Federal
Reserve Board's implementing regulations. Congress created the
defense to encourage reliance on Board interpretations,17 3 and to
relieve those subject to the Act of the burden of choosing "between
the Board's construction of the Act and [their] own assessment of
how a court [would] interpret the Act."' 7 4 Other regulatory

schemes contain similar provisions
76

75

which provide an adequate

solution to the problem.

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has adopted guidelines
which generally proscribe second impression interpretations. It
created those guidelines even though it has been successful in applying later interpretations retroactively. 177 The IRS generally encourages reliance on revenue rulings, and has stated that, if such
rulings are revoked, it will strive not to apply a new ruling retroactively. 1 78 Although private letter rulings may only be relied on by
those to whom they are addressed, 179 others can protect themselves
172 See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (1982).
173 Id.
174 See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1980).
175 See, e.g., section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 259(a) (1982),
which provides that an employer shall not be liable for failure to pay wages required by the
Davis-Bacon Act if he proves good-faith reliance on "any written administrative regulation,
order, ruling, approval, or interpretation" of the Secretary.
176 One objection to the good faith defense is that it prevents retroactive effect regardless of the regulatory need for such effect. An agency can alter its interpretations prospectively. Once an agency issues an interpretive ruling, however, those who act in good faith
reliance on that ruling are insulated from liability. However, if the agency really wants to
make a retroactive change, it may be able to do so by amending the regulation to achieve
the regulatory objective, and then applying the new regulation retroactively. Although this
author has previously suggested that the good faith defense should be considered as a possible response to the problem of second impression interpretations, see The Deference Rule,
supra note 12, at 616-17, it may not provide the best approach. Retroactivity analysis also
seeks to protect those who have relied on existing interpretations, but has the advantage of
permitting retroactivity when the regulatory interest is sufficient to overcome the reliance
interest. Of course, some regulatory schemes may demand certainty and stability more
than flexibility. The Truth-In-Lending Act is, in Congress' judgment, one of those
schemes.
177 See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965) ("The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations
to that end is not the power to make law ...but the power to adopt regulations to carry into
effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute."). See also Manocchio v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1983); Chock Full O'Nuts Corp. v. United States, 322
F. Supp. 772, 775-76 (S.D.N.Y 1971); Charbonnet v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 874, 878
(E.D. La. 1971). But see Elkins v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 669, 679-81 (1983) (in a dispute
about the proper interpretation of regulation the court noted that the regulation, as interpreted, could not be applied retroactively if there was "evidence of unconscionable injury
or undue hardship suffered by the taxpayer in reliance on the erroneous position") (quoting Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957)).
178 § 7.01(3) of Rev. Proc. 78-24, 1978-2 C.B. 503.
179 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(2) (1985) provides that a "taxpayer may not rely on an advance
ruling issued to another taxpayer."
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by requesting their own rulings.' 8 0 If a ruling is obtained, it may
8 2
generally be relied on' 8 ' in present and future transactions.1
While the availability of a good faith defense may provide a
remedy for the problem of second impression interpretations, not
all regulatory schemes contain such a defense, and not all agencies
have procedures like those used by the IRS.' 8 3 In evaluating the
effect of second impression interpretations under these other regulatory schemes, several guidelines can be suggested. As with first
impression interpretations, a person's reliance on a second impression interpretation must be reasonable. 8 4 As a general rule, the
reasonableness of that reliance should be presumed from the fact
that the person has acted consistently with a ruling's language and
purpose. The fact that administrative interpretations are not law
85
and can be overruled by the courts should not be controlling.
180
181

See 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(c) (1985).
26 C.F.R. § 601.201(1)(5) (1985) provides:
Except in rare or unusual circumstances, the revocation or modification of a ruling
will not be applied retroactively to the taxpayer for whom the ruling was issued or
to a taxpayer whose liability was directly involved in the ruling if (1) there has been
no misstatement or omission of material facts, (2) the facts developed later are not
materially different from the facts on which the ruling was based, (3) there has
been no change in the applicable law, (4) the ruling was originally issued with
respect to a prospective or proposed transaction, and (5) the taxpayer directly involved in the ruling acted in good faith in reliance upon the ruling and the retroactive revocation would be to the taxpayer's detriment.
182 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(1)(6) (1985) provides:
A ruling issued on a particular transaction represents a holding of the Service on
that transaction only. However, the application of that ruling to the transaction
will not be affected by the later issuing of regulations (either temporary or final), if
the conditions specified in section 17.05 are met. If the ruling is later found to be
in error or no longer in accord with the position of the Service, it will not give the
taxpayer protection for a like transaction in the same or later year.
183 The Department of the Interior is another agency which does have such procedures.
Its policies provide that it will not apply an overruling interpretation retroactively "when to
do so would adversely affect actions taken and rights acquired by private persons on the
faith of earlier decisions and would inure to the benefit of other private persons." Safarik v.
Udall, 304 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Other agencies will, at times, mitigate the retroactive effect of their actions. See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 76 HARv. L. REV. 921, 934 (1965).
184 Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975) (the Court
cites reliance by states subject to interpretation as justification for giving deference to that
interpretation) (quoted with approval in E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 135 (1977)).
185 Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
301, 327 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I would not make a trap of this settled administrative interpretation by subjecting this employer to penal damages for his good faith reliance
on it."); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966):
Although courts have not generally balked at allowing administrative agencies to
apply a rule newly fashioned in an adjudicative proceeding to past conduct, a decision branding as 'unfair' conduct stamped 'fair' at the time a party acted, raises
judicial hackles considerably more than a determination that merely brings within
the agency's jurisdiction an employer previously left without .... And the hackles
bristle still more when a financial penalty is assessed for action that might well
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The legitimacy of reliance on an interpretation is enhanced if
that interpretation has remained in effect for a substantial period of
time without being modified, questioned, or overruled. 18 6 The
courts have held that a person may legitimately assume that a longstanding, unquestioned interpretation is "correct" and worthy of
reliance. 18 7 They have also emphasized that such interpretations
18 8
should not be overturned lightly.
Reliance is correspondingly less appropriate when the governing agency has warned against such reliance.18 9 The agency can
provide this warning either directly, such as when an interpretation
is questioned or overruled, or indirectly, such as when the interpretation has been frequently modified.1 9 0 These actions put the reguhave been avoided if the agency's changed disposition had been earlier made
known, or might even have been taken in express reliance on the standard previously established.
See also K. DAvis, supra note 25, § 7.23, at 116 (retroactive change of settled law may produce unjust results).
186 See, e.g., Mehta v. INS, 574 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1978) (alleged reliance on prior
administrative interpretation almost a year after the interpretation was revoked; the court
held that the new interpretation could be retroactively applied). See also Traynor, supra note
21, at 547-48.
187 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that long-standing interpretations
are entitled to greater deference. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965) (the Court
noted that the agency's interpretation was long-standing, and that others had relied on it,
as a basis for giving deference); McLaren v. Fleischer, 257 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1921):
If not the only reasonable construction of the act, [the agency's view] is at least an
admissible one. It therefore comes within the rule that the practical construction
given to an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of different constructions, by those
charged with the duty of executing it is entitled to great respect and, if acted upon
for a number of years, will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons.
See also Griswold, supra note 13, at 406-07, 408-09. Griswold states that:
[W]hen a regulation is new, even though it is fairly contemporaneous with the
statute, it is still in a sense on trial. In the immediate test of actual experience it
may be found wanting, and it may be necessary to change it to fit conditions as
they develop in actual fact. That, in large measure, is what we mean by administration. But after a while, and not a very long while, the probationary period should
pass. A few years, at the most, should suffice. All of the arguments about reliance
and certainty and predictability acquire new force. When a regulation has remained unchanged for many years, without contest or alteration, it seems obviously bad judicial tax administration to substitute the Court's construction of the
statute for the administrative interpretation which has been relied on for so long a
time.
Id. at 409.
188 Traynor points out in a perceptive discussion of whether courts should apply overruling precedent retroactively, that a "bad precedent is doubly evil because it has not only
inflicted hardship but threatens to continue doing so." Traynor, supra note 2 1, at 540. But
see Prospective Overruling, supra note 2, at 947.
189 See McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1042 (5th Cir. 1981) (retroactive application
denied by the court when the interpretation was inconsistent with prior agency practice).
190 See C.H. Guenther & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 983 (5th Cir.) (agency attempted
to apply administrative precedent retroactively; using the Chenery balancing test, the court
concluded that retroactive effect was permissible since the new decision had been foreshadowed by prior judicial and administrative precedent which had undercut the then existing
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lated person on notice that the agency may depart from the
interpretation, and therefore, that reliance may be inappropriate.
Even in this situation, however, reliance claims should not be
summarily rejected. Although an agency's criticisms or modifications signal an interpretation's demise, those subject to the interpretation can never be sure that the overruling will in fact
materialize. They also cannot be sure when the overruling will occur. Thus, although the regulated person may hedge his reliance
on an interpretation, he must still respect it. Moreover, even
though an agency may signal that it intends to overrule an interpretation, 191 it might not indicate which interpretation will replace it.
The legitimacy of a person's reliance on any interpretation depends, however, on the authoritativeness of that interpretation.
Agencies issue interpretations in many different forms and at many
different levels. Generally, the regulated person should only rely
on interpretations which are institutional rather than individual in
character. 192 Most agencies establish interpretations and rulings
sections to insure that interpretive decisions are given careful and
informed consideration. A person should be able to rely on these
"official" interpretive rulings, but not on statements by low-level
officials regarding their "interpretations."' 93 If the regulated person could "rely" on the advice of low-level agency employees, he
would have little incentive to use established interpretive processes.
Although an agency normally issues interpretive rulings
through its legislative branch, it may also issue interpretations
through its prosecutorial and adjudicative branches.' 94 To the
precedent), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); American Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d
1321, 1328 (5th Cir. 1970) (Rejecting assertions that agency's new decision came as a complete surprise, the court noted that the agency's prior decision "demonstrated the erosion
of employers' freedom in treating jobless economic strikers as new applicants.").
The principles that apply to judicial decisions overruling prior precedent also apply to
administrative interpretations:
Although litigants may have actually relied on a prior rule in conducting their daily
affairs, courts have generally not protected reliance when the overruled decision
has been repeatedly weakened by cases that stopped short of explicitly overruling
it or when the prior rule's abandonment has been clearly foreshadowed. In these
situations, a litigant's claim that his reliance was justified becomes "weaker and
weaker as the warning signs mount."
ProspectiveApplication, supra note 24, at 478. See also Munzer, supra note 1, at 430-32; Prospective Overruling,supra note 2, at 947.
191 See, e.g., Stewart Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1983).
192 See Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 171 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983). See also ContemporaneousConstruction Discovery, supra
note 74, at 384-88.
193 Pennzoil, 680 F.2d at 171. But see Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d
1029, 1063-65 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
194 See McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1981) (interpretations of an
ambiguous regulation by the agency branch responsible for such matters were consistent
with the plaintiff's interpretation; the court held that plaintiff's reliance was reasonable).
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extent they involve a final decision by the agency, adjudicative interpretations can be deemed institutional in character. 195 Interpretations by the prosecutorial arm of the agency can also be relied on,
96
at least until the adjudicative or legislative branch rejects them.
Reliance is also more appropriate when the agency has encouraged it. NationalAssociation of Independent Television Producers and
Distributors v. FCC'9 7 provides a good illustration. The case involved an amendment to a legislative rule rather than a regulatory
interpretation. Through the prior rule, the agency sought to encourage independent producers by limiting the amount of prime
time network programming. 9 8 The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) then revoked the rule, delaying the revocation
for eight months. The Second Circuit refused to allow the revocation ,to take effect that soon, noting that the FCC encouraged independent producers to make greater investments under the new
rule and that they could not recoup those investments in just eight
months.
2.

Regulatory Interest

The regulatory interest portion of the balancing test does not
lend itself to precise rules or formulas. The regulatory interest will
vary depending on the regulatory scheme involved and the nature
and effect of the interpretation. Some situations will demand retroactive application, 99 while others may preclude it.200
195

See Contemporaneous Construction Discovery, supra note 74, at 387-88.

196 In Runnells v. Andrus, 484 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1980), the court denied retroactive effect because of a prior administrative practice on which the regulated person had
relied.
197 502 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1974).
198 The Prime Time Access Rule prohibited network programming from occupying
more than three or four prime time hours, depending on circumstances, during the day.
During the remaining "local access hour," stations could not show feature films or offnetwork programming (reruns). Independent producers benefited from this rule because
they produced the local programs.
199 See Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970).
200 See McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1981). In McDonald, the
court held that the public interest did not require retroactive application of an interpretation. The court noted that the only public interest implicated was that of insuring "equal
access to leases through full disclosure." Id. at 1045. Plaintiffs' interpretation complied
with the spirit of the Act by fully disclosing all interests in the lease. The court refused to
apply the agency's interpretations retroactively since substantial harm would befall plaintiffs' interests. The court also noted that retroactive application might draw into question
the validity of hundreds of leases already issued which could, in and of itself, be contrary to
the public interest. In White v. Califano, 473 F. Supp. 503, 505-06 (S.D. W.Va. 1979), the
court held that new disability rules could not be retroactively applied to the extent they
were inconsistent with prior practice. The court noted that the governing Act, the Social
Security Act, should be liberally construed to effectuate the Congressional mandate to provide disability payments to all qualifying persons. Retroactive application would be incon-
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Most cases involving retroactive application will implicate
some regulatory interest. Retroactivity frees the agency from the
administrative inconvenience of simultaneously applying two different rules, one for prior transactions, and another for subsequent
transactions. Retroactivity also allows the agency to implement its
policy changes immediately. 20 1 These considerations, however, are
not overriding. Inconvenience resulting from the existence of dual
rules should not, by itself, sustain retroactivity. Only when the situation results in severe administrative problems should the adminis20 2
trative convenience argument justify retroactivity.
The regulatory interest in applying an interpretation retroactively may be less compelling in several instances. One is when retroactive application will have broad, adverse consequences. 20 3 In
NLRB v. E & B Brewing Co. ,204 prior National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) rulings upheld the validity of exclusive hiring hall contracts. When a later decision overruled that prior precedent, holding that exclusive contracts were invalid unless they carried three
safeguards, the Sixth Circuit refused to give the new precedent retroactive effect.2 0 5 The court was concerned, among other things,
that retroactive application would invalidate numerous labor con20 6
tracts nationwide.
The regulatory interest will also be less compelling when an
agency revokes an interpretation that has been in effect for a considerable period of time. As noted above, the longer an interpreta20 7
tion has been in effect, the more likely it is to generate reliance.
In such a situation, it is less likely that there will be a compelling
need to apply a new interpretation retroactively. After all, if an
agency advocates an interpretation for a substantial period of time,
it is difficult for it to argue, absent significantly altered circumstances, that it has a compelling need to replace that interpretation
20 8
immediately.
Retroactive application might be justified, however, in several
instances. The first is when an agency's interpretation is designed
sistent with that mandate. See also Stewart Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir.
1983).
201 See Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 108, 278 F.2d 237, 242-43
(D.C. Cir. 1960); Local 719, Int'l Prod., Serv. & Sales Employees Union v. McLeod, 183 F.
Supp. 790, 793-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
202 See cases cited at note 201 supra.
203 See McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463
U.S. 1073, 1106-07 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
204 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 908 (1961).
205 Id. at 600-01.
206 Id. at 600.
207 See notes 190-91 supra.
208 See NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1966).
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to eliminate a loophole which permits evasion of regulatory requirements. In this instance the regulated person's reliance on a
prior interpretation is less legitimate and therefore less worthy of
protection. 20 9 This is particularly true if the regulated person is

aware of the loophole and is seeking to exploit

it.210

Retroactive application might also be justified when an interpretation has a substantial impact on public health. In Certified Color
IndustrialCommission v. Secretary ofHealth, Education and Welfare, 2 1 1 the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) revoked its certification of
209

Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077 (lst Cir.

1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979), did not involve an interpretation of a regulation,
but an application of the Chenery balancing test to an agency's attempt to apply a new substantive rule retroactively. The case involved the Medicare reimbursement scheme under
which health care providers were entitled to reimbursement for their reasonable costs.
Under those regulations, a provider could depreciate certain capital assets on an accelerated basis. This provision was subject to abuse because any provider that withdrew from
the program early, after receiving its accelerated depreciation, had been reimbursed for
more than its reasonable cost. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, therefore, promulgated a later regulation allowing it to recover, from any provider who withdrew
from the program, amounts received in excess of what would have been allowed had
straight line depreciation been used. Id. at 1080-82.
Adams Nursing Home entered the program before the recapture regulation was passed
and withdrew afterward. The Department used the regulation to recapture payments made
prior to the passage of the regulation. The court determined that Adams' claim that it
relied on the prior state of the law was not compelling:
The rule has a greater impact on the expectations of those who planned from the
start to take advantage of accelerated depreciation by quitting the program while
they were still ahead.... While such an expectation may not be wholly illegitimate,
it would seem to have nothing to recommend it other than the traditional desire to
take advantage of a loophole.
548 F.2d at 1081. The court also emphasized that the agency had reserved the right to
make retroactive changes as necessary. Id. But see Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged
v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1978).
210 See, e.g., Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
920 (1970), which involved administrative precedent. Laidlaw sought to break a union by
refusing to offer reinstatement to strikers who had been permanently replaced. Under
prior Board precedent, this action was permissible. But a later decision required employers
to reinstate replaced strikers as positions became available. That decision was applied retroactively to Laidlaw. Moreover, Laidlaw was ordered to give backpay to employees denied
reinstatement. The employer's motive, of trying to break the union by punishing those who
,vent out on strike, played a significant role in the court's decision. The statutory interest in
protecting employees who exercise their right to strike was also important. Id. at 107.
The same precedent was not applied retroactively in Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store
Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In that case, no evidence was
introduced to demonstrate that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive. It initially
refused to offer reinstatement based on prior precedent. When the later precedent was
announced, the company voluntarily applied the precedent retroactively and began rehiring displaced strikers as positions became available. No backpay order was rendered. See
also Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1260 (3rd Cir.
1978) (Retroactive rules designed to cure defects in regulatory schemes, such as the Medicare program, are often sustained because the "interest in the retroactive curing of such a
defect in the administration of government outweighs the individual's interest in benefitting from the defect.") (quoting from Hochman, supra note 2, at 705-06).
211 283 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1960).
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certain food additives. This revocation rendered all products made
with that additive "adulterated," thereby precluding their resale.
The court justified its decision to apply the revocation retroactively
212
on the "imperative" of public health.
The appropriateness of retroactivity will, however, be affected
by the nature of the remedy being sought. Injunctive relief may be
appropriate when a significant regulatory interest is affected. In the
Certfied Color case, the agency did not seek injunctive relief, but its
action precluded future use of an adulterated product. This remedy was the only one that would adequately protect the public
health.
It will be more difficult to justify retroactivity when penalties
are sought.213 In the regulatory area, penalties are imposed for two
reasons: to punish a violator for wrongful conduct, and to deter
him, as well as others, from committing similar violations in the future.214 Retroactive application of an interpretation may not further either of those objectives. Unless the violator has notice of
regulatory requirements and an opportunity to conform his conduct to those requirements, punishment is not justified and there is
no possibility of deterrence. In the instance of a retroactive interpretation, notice and the opportunity to conform one's conduct
may or may not exist. If prior regulatory events clearly presaged
the retroactive interpretation, then fair notice may have been given.
But, if an initial interpretation is novel, or the agency has overruled
a longstanding administrative interpretation, no such opportunity
may have existed. Penalties can only be justified if, as in the case of
an initial interpretation, the regulated person was negligent in failing to seek interpretive guidance.
Monetary awards might be justified for compensatory or restitutionary purposes. In E.L. Wiegand Division v. NLRB, 215 some of
petitioner's employees were disabled and receiving sickness and accident benefits when a strike began. Under prior Board precedent,
an employer could treat such employees as strikers and terminate
their benefits. 21 6 In the Wiegand case, however, the Board overruled
its prior precedent, holding that petitioner could not treat disabled
212 Id. at 626.
213 See Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1336 (6th Cir. 1978) (A regulatory interpretation may be applied prospectively. The court, however, refused retroactive application because penalties were involved, and the regulation did not provide fair notice of the
regulatory requirements.). See alsoJ.L. Foti Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 687 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.
1982); Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
But see Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
214 See Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
215 650 F.2d 463, 470-72 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
216 Id. at 471.
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employees as strikers unless they manifested support for the strike.
Moreover, the Board applied its new rule retroactively, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner had relied on the prior precedent. 21 7 The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that employers provided sickness benefits to employees based on their prior service.
Thus, petitioner was obligated to pay such benefits, and would gain
a windfall if it were allowed to escape that obligation. 2 18
3.

Deference

One relatively important, but as yet unanswered, question is
whether an agency's decision to apply an interpretation retroactively should be entitled to deference. In a related context, commentators have criticized the courts for deferring to administrative
interpretations of statutes or regulations. 2 19 It has been argued
that this deference makes it difficult to challenge administrative action.2 20 In the words of Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, "[t]he
cards have been hopelessly stacked against the regulated people in
this country." 22 1 Deferring to an agency's decision to apply an interpretation retroactively may generate equal criticism.
The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved whether deference is required on retroactivity issues. 2 22 The lower courts have
217 Id. at 470-71.
218 Id. at 473-74.
219 See McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119,
1164-68 (1977); Monaghan, supra note 70; O'Reilly, Deference Makes A Difference: A Study of
Impacts of the BumpersJudicialReview Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1980); Woodward &
Levin, supra note 70; The Deference Rule, supra note 12.
220 The Senate Committee on theJudiciary, in its report on The Regulatory Reform Act,
stated:
When a citizen challenges an agency's rule or order in the courts, the odds should
not be stacked against him by judicial presumptions in favor of the agency. The
judicially created doctrine of deference to agency interpretations of law, which
some courts have elevated to a virtual presumption of correctness, places the bureaucratic thumb on the scales of justice, weighing them against the citizen. We
intend this amendment to reestablish an equal balance.
S. REP. No. 24, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1981).
221 125 CONG. REC. 23,481 (1979). Senator Bumpers proposed an amendment to the
Administrative Procedure Act to eliminate the deference rule. S. 1080, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1985). The bill, especially the original version, was widely criticized. See McGowan,
supra note 219, at 1164-68; Monaghan, supra note 70; Woodward & Levin, supra note 70; The
Deference Rule, supra note 12, at 603-22. The amendment did not pass.
222 The Supreme Court's rhetoric on the subject is frequently inconsistent with its actions. At times, the Supreme Court stresses the importance of deferring to administrative
interpretations. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) ("deference to the Federal Reserve [Board] is compelled by necessity; a court that tries to chart a
true course to the Act's purpose embarks upon a voyage without a compass when it disregards the agency's views"). At other times, though, the Court can forget this important
presumption even though it is pointed out by a fellow Justice. See United States v. Swank,
451 U.S. 571, 585-86 (1981) (White, J., dissenting):
The Court today rejects the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of §§ 611
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taken inconsistent positions; some have held that deference is required, 223 and others have held that it is not required.2 24 The
Supreme Court has ruled that if the responsible agency has not
ruled on the retroactivity question, it should be allowed to do so.225
One can argue that courts should defer to agencies on retroactivity questions. Because the responsible agency should have more
expertise, it should be better able to determine the regulatory interest in applying an interpretation retroactively. Agencies may be
less sensitive, however, to the potential inequities in a given situation, and thus it may be desirable for the courts to maintain strong
judicial oversight. 226 A court can maintain strong oversight and
and 613 and the applicable regulation ....
My disagreement with the Court's
opinion is simple. It is not our function to speculate on who deserves an allowance; our duty is to determine if the Service's interpretation is a reasonable one.
Since in my view the construction of the statutory provisions and the attendant
regulation is clearly acceptable, I dissent.
See also AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 712 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting):
The plurality ignores applicable canons of construction, apparently because it
finds their existence inconvenient. But as we stated quite recently, the inquiry into
statutory purposes should be "informed by an awareness that the regulation is
entitled to deference unless it can be said not to be a reasoned and supportable
interpretation of the Act."... Can it honestly be said that the Secretary's interpretation of the Act is "unreasoned" or "unsupportable"? ... The plurality's disregard of these principles gives credence to the frequently voiced criticism that they
are honored only when the Court finds itself in substantive agreement with the
agency action at issue.
223 See, e.g., Certainteed Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 1042, 1056 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Barring
some extraordinary circumstance, this court will not disturb the purely administrative determination that giving retrospective or prospective effect to a policy change best effectuates the purposes of its governing act."). See also NLRB v. Chicago Marine Containers, Inc.,
745 F.2d 493, 498-99 (7th Cir. 1984).
224 See Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982);
Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
("Which side of [the Chenery balancing test] preponderates is in each case a question of law,
resolvable by reviewing courts with no overriding obligation of deference to the agency
decision."); White v. Califano, 473 F. Supp. 503, 506 (S.D. W.Va. 1979) ("The decision
whether to grant or deny retroactive force to newly adopted administrative rules is purely a
question of law and as such a reviewing court is under no overriding obligation of deference to the agency decision."). See also McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1043-44 (5th Cir.
1981) (the court raised the issue, but failed to resolve it); Daughters of Miriam Center for
the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1978) (the court refused to defer to
the agency's decision to apply a new legislative rule retroactively).
225 See, e.g., NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 10 n.10
(1974) ("[A] court reviewing an agency decision following an intervening change of policy
by the agency should remand to permit the agency to decide in the first instance whether
giving the change retrospective effect will best effectuate the policies underlying the
agency's governing act."). See also Certainteed Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 1042 (11th Cir.
1983); Blackman-Uhler Chem. Div., Synalloy Corp. v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 1118, 1119 (4th Cir.
1977) (the court remanded the case to the agency for it to determine whether the precedent
should be retroactively applied). See also Corr, supra note 8, at 785.
226 See Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1258-59
(3d Cir. 1978). The court stated:
We noted that the administrative agency here has no particular expertise concern-
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still accept the agency's conclusions if it finds them persuasive.2 2 7
IV. Conclusion
The notion that everyone is presumed to know the law, which
is based on the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse, has
become a fundamental tenet of this country's legal system. 22 8 But,
this tenet cannot be fairly applied when the law is uncertain and
unknown, 2 29 and can perpetrate unfairness when novel or unanticipated regulatory interpretations are applied retroactively to the
detriment of legitimate reliance interests. Nonetheless, courts apply regulatory interpretations retroactively even though the regulated person did not have fair notice of such interpretations at the
time he acted. Courts have done so even though the agency which
issued the interpretation was previously uncertain about the proper
meaning of the regulation, and even though the agency may have
previously construed the regulation differently.
In recent years, courts have been more sensitive to the retroactive effect of regulatory interpretations. Unfortunately, as in many
other areas of the law, the courts analyze the validity of such interpretations under conflicting principles: the declaratory theory, retroactivity, estoppel, and vagueness. The courts also allow litigants
to use an interpretation's retroactive effect as a basis for invalidating interpretations. Because courts utilize such diverse approaches,
ing the issue of retroactivity. To the contrary, the extent to which retroactive effect may be given to a promulgation is governed by principles of law that have
been developed and refined by the courts, primarily in the context of constitutional adjudication.
Id at 1259.
227 In reviewing administrative interpretation of statutes, courts apply a similar standard. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Accord Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 315 (1979); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974); Office of
Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also Woodward &
Levin, supra note 70, at 332-35. Moreover, courts seem willing to defer to considered
agency conclusions on retroactivity issues. See, e.g., Daughters of Miriam Center for the
Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1978) (the court decided to exercise
"independent judgment" on the retroactivity issue, but it "searches" for the agency's reasons for its actions).
228 As Mr. Justice Holmes so aptly pointed out, "to admit the excuse [of ignorance of
the law] at all would be to encourage ignorance where the lawmaker has determined to
make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger
interests on the other side of the scales." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881). See also

1 J. AusTiN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 498 (1869).
229 See C. SANDS, supra note 2, § 41.02, at 247:
It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that retroactive application of new
laws involves a high risk of being unfair. There is general consensus among all
people that notice or warning of the rules that are to be applied to determine their
affairs should be given in advance of the actions whose effects are to be judged by
them. The hackneyed maxim that everyone is held to know the law, itself a principle of dubious wisdom, nevertheless presupposes that the law is at least susceptible of being known. But this is not possible as to law which has not yet been made.
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there is no assurance that like cases will be treated in a similar manner. On the contrary, there is a significant likelihood that like cases
will be treated inconsistently.
In the future, courts should use a three-step process in retroactivity cases. If an administrative interpretation is involved, they
should evaluate it to make sure that it is valid and permissible. If
the interpretation is valid, the courts should then analyze the underlying regulation to determine if it suffers from constitutionally
impermissible levels of indefiniteness. If the regulation is sufficiently definite, the courts should then determine whether the interpretation should be applied only prospectively, or whether it
should also be applied retroactively.
Resolution of the retroactivity question should involve, as suggested by Chenery, 23 0 a balancing of the "ill effect" of retroactivity

against the regulatory interest in applying the new interpretation
retroactively. Expanding their current analysis, courts should consider not only whether a person's expectations have been defeated,
but also whether those expectations are legitimate. Expectations
that are not legitimate should not be given much weight in the balancing test. Finally, the courts need to carefully scrutinize the regulatory interest implicated when they apply an interpretation
retroactively.

230

332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).

